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I. INTRODUCTION
[I]f there are sufficient basic similarities to make a comparison possible, there are, equally,
sufficient differences to make it fruitful.
- L.C.B. Gower'
Convergence theory and shareholder empowerment represent
two major debates in contemporary corporate governance. A pervasive
underlying assumption in these debates is that a high level of
corporate governance homogeneity exists within the common law
world in relation to shareholder rights. This Article challenges that
assumption through a detailed case study of the decision by News
Corporation ("News Corp.") to move from Australia to Delaware. As
events surrounding News Corp.'s reincorporation illustrate, although
there are undoubtedly basic similarities between corporate law in the
United States and in other common law jurisdictions, there are also
fascinating, but underappreciated, differences.
In late 2007, News Corp. became the subject of intense media
attention when it successfully acquired Dow Jones & Company ("Dow
Jones"), publisher of the Wall Street Journal, and brought it under the
aegis of News Corp.'s $70 billion global media empire. 2 Nonetheless,
News Corp.'s migration to the United States from Australia, which
paved the way for this victory-a victory that appears increasingly
Pyrrhic3 in the light of the global financial crisis4-was neither smooth
1. L.C.B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1956).
2. The success of the bid was assured after News Corp. finally secured support from the
majority of the Bancroft family, which had controlled Dow Jones & Company since 1902 and held
64 percent of its voting shares. Richard Perez-Pena & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Dow Jones Deal
Gives Murdoch a Coveted Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at Al. See generally Mogul's Dream:
Murdoch Wins His Bid for Dow Jones - News Corp.'s Success Follows Delicate Dance Between
Suitor, Target, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2007, at Al (detailing Murdoch's interactions with the
Bancroft family). Formal approval for the acquisition was given on December 13, 2007, when
60.2 percent of Dow Jones shareholders voted in favor of the deal. Joshua Chaffin, Dow Jones
Now With Murdoch, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 14, 2007, at 21; Richard Perez-Pena, News Corp.
Completes Takeover of Dow Jones, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at 4.
3. See Tim Arango, News Corp. Loss Shows Trouble at Dow Jones, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2009, at Bl (stating that many media analysts considered that News Corp. had paid too much for
Dow Jones, when News Corp. purchased it for approximately $5 billion). In spite of promises by
News Corp., at the time of the acquisition, of increased investment in Dow Jones, in February
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nor a fait accompli. Rather, the original 2004 reincorporation proposal
prompted a revolt by a number of institutional investors concerned
that the move to Delaware would significantly diminish shareholder
rights. The institutional investors attempted to respond to this threat
by demanding that News Corp. make certain concessions preserving
existing shareholder rights under Australian corporate law. As this
Article demonstrates, however, the protection embodied in these
concessions was later effectively subverted by a variety of means.
The News Corp. reincorporation saga highlights some
important differences between current U.S. and Australian corporate
law regimes. Specifically, the reincorporation shows how shareholder
rights were reduced as a result of these differences. It offers a valuable
counterpoint to the persistent assumption in much contemporary legal
theory that a cohesive Anglo-American model of shareholder
protection exists, and it identifies some crucial corporate governance
fault lines within the common law world.
The News Corp. story also has significant implications for
Delaware law. It demonstrates, for example, that Delaware's
preference for managerial fiat over strong shareholder rights6 may
provide Delaware with a competitive advantage in encouraging
reincorporation by foreign companies. Nonetheless, the concessions
granted by News Corp. to its institutional investors directly conflicted
with Delaware's cardinal principle of centralized managerial power.6
2009, the Wall Street Journal announced newsroom layoffs. Kenneth Li & Andrew Edgecliffe-
Johnson, Murdoch Remains Bullish in the Face of News Corp Challenges, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 7, 2009, at 9; Shira Ovide, Corporate News: News Corp. Posts $6.4 Billion Loss After
Charges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at B3.
4. On February 5, 2009, News Corp. announced a $6.4 billion loss in its second quarter
and a 50 percent reduction in the value of Dow Jones. Mr. Murdoch forecast that earnings from
the News Corp. empire would fall by around 30 percent in 2009, in what he described as the
worst economic crisis in News Corp.'s fifty-year history. Arango, supra note 3, at Bl; Li &
Edgecliffe-Johnson, supra note 3, at 9. Indeed, the global financial crisis appears to have
impelled something of a retreat by News Corp. from its prior image as one of the world's most
acquisitive media companies. Gerald Magpily, Murdoch and News Corp. Holding onto Wallet,
DEALSCAPE, July 9, 2009, http://www.thedeal.com/dealscape/2009/07/murdochand-news corp_
holding.php.
5. The preference for managerial interests in the United States, compared to a preference
for shareholder interests in other common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, has
been noted on a number of occasions. It has been said, for example, that "[w]hile the focus in the
UK has been on attracting capital, the focus in the U.S. has been on attracting managers."
Jonathan Rickford, Do Good Governance Recommendations Change the Rules for the Board of
Directors?, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAw 461, 474 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch
eds., 2003); see also John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile
Takeovers, and Why? - The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1727 (2007) (identifying these competing preferences in the takeover context).




As Chancellor Chandler recognized in UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp.,7
this conflict had ramifications for the appeal of Delaware as a
potential reincorporation site for foreign companies. Chancellor
Chandler was concerned that if Delaware law were found to trump the
pro-shareholder concessions granted by News Corp., it might deter
shareholders of foreign corporations from approving reincorporations
in Delaware in the future.8
News Corp.'s reincorporation also has implications for U.S.
corporate law reform generally. In recent times, there have been
growing calls in the United States for reforms granting shareholders
stronger rights.9 The momentum in this regard appears to be
intensifying, with a range of proposals to increase shareholder power
now on the table.10 Some critics of shareholder empowerment,
however, have defended the regulatory status quo from an
evolutionary/efficiency perspective, suggesting that, if shareholder
empowerment were efficient, we would already see it in the
marketplace." The News Corp. reincorporation story challenges
claims to the inevitability of the U.S. system of corporate governance
by showing major differences between the U.S. approach and that of
other common law jurisdictions. Indeed, the current proposals to
enhance shareholder rights, despite being the subject of great
controversy in the United States, 12 fall far short of rights already held
by shareholders in other common law countries, such as the United
Kingdom and Australia.
Historically, the United States has paid only sporadic attention
to international corporate governance regimes.' 3 There are, however,
7. Id.
8. UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. Civ.A. 1699-N, 2006 WL 207505, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan.
19, 2006).
9. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 847-50 (2005) (comparing U.S. and U.K. corporate law to argue that U.S. law should
no longer "view the modern corporation as a 'purely representative democracy' ").
10. See infra notes 38-43. For a summary of recent reform developments, see The Battle for
Shareholder Access: The Current State of Play, Posting of Charles M. Nathan to The Harvard
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2009/05/30/the-battle-for-shareholder-access-the-current-
state-of-play/ (May 30, 2009, 7:09 EST).
11. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736-37 (2006).
12. See infra notes 38-43.
13. There are a number of possible reasons for the relative lack of attention historically
paid in the United States to international corporate regimes. These include the fact that the
United States has traditionally been a regulatory leader, rather than follower, and that the
richness of the U.S. federalist system obviated the need to look abroad for regulatory innovation.
4 [Vol. 63:1:1
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several recent developments that suggest U.S. lawmakers are
increasingly interested in and receptive to the regulatory experiences
of other jurisdictions. First, heightened interest in international
corporate governance has traditionally occurred during periods of
weak U.S. economic performance, such as the current financial
crisis. 1 4 This crisis has demonstrated "that there are . . . costs to
under-regulation,"15 and reform and intensified regulation appear
politically inevitable.16 Second, the regulatory field within the United
States has opened up, with Delaware's central position in corporate
law now subject to challenge. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
represented a federal encroachment into the traditional state-based
corporate arena.'7 Indeed, some have suggested that the enduring
legacy of this Act is to render federal law an equal partner with state
law in the regulation of corporate governance.18 The recent U.S.
See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statutory
Regimes, 33 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 819, 819-21 (2008).
14. For discussion of the circuitous evolutionary path of comparative corporate governance
debate, see Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance,
23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 477, 480-85 (2005). In the early 1990s, for example, when the United States
was in recession, there was much U.S. interest in the governance models of Germany and Japan,
which had more successful economies at that time. Cf. Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993);
Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102
YALE L.J. 2021, 2036 (1993).
15. John C. Coffee Jr., Financial Crises 101: What Can We Learn from Scandals and
Meltdowns - from Enron to Subprime?, in THE CREDIT CRUNCH AND THE LAW 37 (RP Austin ed.,
2008). But see The Proper Limits of Shareholder Proxy Access, Posting of Troy A. Paredes to The
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/06/30/the-proper-limits-of-shareholder-proxy-access/
(June 30, 2009, 10:53 EST) (stating, in criticizing proposed Rule 14a- 11, "we cannot overlook the
risk of overregulating").
16. Early in his term of office, President Obama has, for example, criticized the Bush
Administration's adherence to a deregulatory agenda, and condemned U.S. regulators for having
been "asleep at the switch." He indicated that major financial regulatory reform would be a
priority for his government, and this has indeed proven to be the case. See Joanna Chung &
Andrew Ward, Obama Signals Change with Choice of Schapiro, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 19,
2008, at 3. Regulatory roll-back is also constrained in the current political environment. See
generally Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future? 108 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 385, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1404967 (explaining how, from a political standpoint, reducing
regulation of small firms is much more feasible than "broad-based reform benefiting large firms
and stock exchanges").
17. Professor Bainbridge, for example, has described the reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 as "the most dramatic expansion of federal regulatory power over corporate governance
since the New Deal," arguing that the reforms were "deeply flawed" and would undermine
traditional board autonomy. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate
Law, 26 REG. 26 (2003).
18. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 100
(2003).
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reform proposals concerning shareholder rights would, if
implemented, augment this power shift. 19 Finally, the assumption
that Delaware's traditional dominance is attributable to the
superiority of its legal rules is also under pressure.20
Within this fluid and evolving regulatory picture, the corporate
governance lessons from other regimes, such as those exemplified by
the News Corp. story, may become important. In the wake of the
global financial crisis, the SEC has sent mixed messages about its
willingness to engage with other common law regulators. Although in
2008 the SEC announced its entry into a pilot mutual recognition
program with Australia in relation to securities market regulation and
investor protection, 21 enthusiasm for the program now appears to have
waned.22 However, several recent U.S. reforms and reform proposals
replicate particular legal provisions of other common law jurisdictions.
19. See generally Paredes, supra note 15 (arguing that an SEC proposal "dictating a direct
right of access to the company's proxy materials" intrudes "far too much on ... the traditional
domain of state corporate law"). For a general discussion of federalism tensions in contemporary
corporate governance, see E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the
Twists and Turns of Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 42-51 (2009).
20. See, e.g., William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's
Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (arguing that the increasing complexity and
uncertainty in Delaware corporate law has "led to a litigation explosion" and high litigation costs
for firms).
21. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Chairman Cox, Prime Minister Rudd
Meet Amid U.S.-Australia Mutual Recognition Talks (Mar. 29, 2008), available at
www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-52.htm. As part of this program, the SEC and the Australian
corporate regulator, ASIC, "agreed to undertake a formal assessment of each other's regulatory
systems to determine the extent to which each jurisdiction produces a comparable level of
investor protection." Id.
22. Although no formal announcements have been made by the SEC on the matter, the
progress of the mutual recognition program appears to have stalled in light of the financial crisis
and following the appointment of Mary Schapiro as Chairman of the SEC in January 2009
(replacing former Chairman Christopher Cox, who was a key supporter of mutual recognition).
See Romano, supra note 16, at 110-11. When asked about the pace of the mutual recognition
process with Australia at her nomination hearing, Chairman Schapiro stated that she held
"some concerns with the speed with which mutual recognition . .. [has] proceeded" and warned of
the need to "take a big step back and look at whether we are headed in the right direction."
Nominations of: Mary Schapiro, Christina D. Romer, Austan D. Goolsbee, Cecilia E. Rouse, and
Daniel K. Tarullo: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong.
22 (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111
senatehearings&docid=f:50221.pdf. Despite this apparent cooling of SEC enthusiasm, other
countries have continued to show interest in the schemes. In June 2009, the Committee of
European Securities Regulators called for submissions into establishing a mutual recognition
process between the United States and European Union. Brooke Masters, Europe Seeks 'Mutual
Recognition' Pact Allowing Direct Sales to US, FIN. TIMES (London), June 12, 2009, at 4. But cf.
James Doran, US Rejects Global Finance Controls, OBSERVER (England), Mar. 8, 2009, at 1
(suggesting that plans for E.U.-U.S. mutual recognition are likely to be hampered by the SEC's
recent change of heart). Industry groups in the United States are said to be generally supportive
of the idea. Masters, supra, at 4.
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For example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
includes a provision requiring a nonbinding shareholder vote on
executive pay, a provision based on U.K. and Australian law, 23 and the
recently proposed legislation for a Shareholder Bill of Rights contains
an analogous provision. 24
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part II discusses
News Corp.'s reincorporation decision and the corresponding reaction
of institutional investors against the background of the contemporary
corporate governance debate over the balance of power between
shareholders and the board. Part III examines various concessions
granted by News Corp. to appease its institutional investors. Parts IV
and V consider, from a comparative law perspective, News Corp.'s
adoption (and subsequent extension) of a poison pill. Finally, Part VI
concludes by analyzing some of the implications of the News Corp.
reincorporation saga for corporate law.
II. BACKGROUND ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND THE EXODUS OF NEWS CORP.
[We are tending toward a managerial, rather than a capitalist society ....
- William L. Cary
25
Rupert Murdoch is a great Australian, in the sense that Attila was a great Hun.
- Geoffrey Robertson QC26
Two contemporary corporate governance debates, relating to
convergence theory and shareholder empowerment, form the
theoretical backdrop to this Article's analysis of the News Corp.
23. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. This provision required that executive compensation
paid by institutions receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") government funding
would be subject to a nonbinding "say on pay" shareholder vote. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/arrainterp.htm; Letter from
Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. On Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, to Mary
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/DoddSchapiro.pdf. The United Kingdom and
Australia introduced a nonbinding shareholder resolution on remuneration in 2002 and 2004
respectively. For a discussion of the operation of the nonbinding vote, see Hill, supra note 13, at
829-36.
24. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://law.du.eduldocuments/corporate-governancellegislation/bill-text-shareholders-bill-of-
rights-act-of-2009.pdf; see Shareholder Bill of Rights Would Provide Say on Pay, NAT'L J.'S
CONGREss DAILY, May 19, 2009.
25. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 670 (1974).
26. Richard Ackland, We Must Not Over-egg Free Speech Argument, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Aug. 31, 2007, at 17.
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reincorporation. The convergence debate reached its zenith at the turn
of the last decade. 27 Its central issue was whether international
corporate laws would converge, 28 or whether differences between
common law and civil law jurisdictions would persist.29 While
convergence theory and the closely allied "law matters" hypothesiS30
highlighted stark legal differences between common law and civil law
jurisdictions,31 they obscured or ignored important differences within
the common law world itself.32 Indeed, both sides of the convergence-
divergence debate often seem to assume that a unified and stable
27. For an overview of the convergence-divergence debate, see CONVERGENCE AND
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004);
Jennifer G. Hill, The Persistent Debate About Convergence in Comparative Corporate Governance,
27 SYDNEY L. REV. 743 (2005).
28. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001) (concluding at the time that "[t]he triumph of the shareholder-
oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured").
29. "Path dependence" theory represented the opposite side of the theoretical divide to
convergence theory and the "law matters" hypothesis. Path dependence scholars traced
differences in corporate governance structures throughout the world to divergent historical,
political, and social factors, which operate in conjunction with law. Given the complexity of the
factors at play, they predicted that convergence, or successful transplantation of elements of one
legal system to another, was highly unlikely. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political
Options, and Governance Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND
MATERIALS 165 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997); Helmut Kohl, Path Dependence
and German Corporate Law: Some Skeptical Remarks from the Sideline, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 189
(1999).
30. The "law matters" hypothesis emanated from the research of corporate finance scholars,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny and was highly influential in defining the
contours of the convergence-divergence debate. These scholars postulated that "law matters", in
the sense that the structure of capital markets is directly linked to a country's corporate
governance regime. Specifically, they predicted that jurisdictions with a high level of minority
shareholder protection would develop dispersed ownership structures, such as those existing in
the United States and United Kingdom. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 1113 (1998).
31. A number of commentators have criticized this aspect of convergence theory and the
'law matters" hypothesis, arguing that perceived differences between the common law and civil
law are often overly generalized and inaccurate. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan
Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 799 n.27 (2002) (explaining that the distinction
between codified law and case law is "less obvious" for corporate law than in the general case);
David A. Skeel Jr, Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1546 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Ruth V. Aguilera, Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley & Deborah E. Rupp,
Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and US, 14
CORP. GOV.: INT'L REV. 147, 147-48 (2006); Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 157, 172-73
(Reinier R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2004); Steven Toms & Mike Wright, Divergence and
Convergence within Anglo-American Corporate Governance Systems: Evidence from the US and
UK 1950-2000, 47 BUS. HIS. 267, 267-68 (2005).
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Anglo-American, or common law, model of corporate governance
exists.33
The controversial shareholder empowerment debate is of more
recent origin.34 In contrast to the broad comparative law sweep of
convergence theory, the shareholder empowerment debate has been
primarily U.S.-focused, with limited acknowledgement of international
corporate law differences. 35 Instigating the debate, Professor Bebchuk
advocated stronger participatory rights for U.S. shareholders in a
range of governance scenarios. 36 The Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation ("Paulson Committee") also recommended increasing U.S.
shareholder rights. 37
33. Toms & Wright, supra note 32, at 267; see, e.g., CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 27, at 27-29 (Jeffrey Gordon & Mark Roe eds., 2004)
(posing the question, "Is the Anglo-American model of shareholder capitalism destined to become
standard or will sharp differences persist?").
34. The debate is played out in a 2006 and 2007 Special Issue of the Harvard Law Review
and Virginia Law Review, respectively. See 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641-81, 1735-84 (2006)
(debating the benefits of shareholder control); 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 653-811 (2007) (same). The
debate can arguably be traced to the refusal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.), to
grant shareholders stronger participatory rights in, for example, the director election process,
which was described at the time as potentially "the forgotten element" of the U.S. post-scandal
reforms. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 953, 999 (2003).
35. Although proponents of stronger shareholder rights have made the point that U.S.
shareholders have more limited rights than shareholders in other jurisdictions, there is little
discussion of this fact in critiques opposing shareholder empowerment, which are predominantly
U.S.-focused. For pro-shareholder rights commentary recognizing regulatory diversity in this
regard, see the comments of the Paulson Committee, infra note 37; Bebchuk, supra note 9, at
847-50.
36. Bebchuk called for increased shareholder participation in relation to both the corporate
election process, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 696-97 (2007); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.
LAW. 43, 44 (2003) and amendment of the corporate constitution, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784-85 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 835 (2005).
37. The Paulson Committee viewed increased shareholder rights as a desirable alternative
to more stringent rule-based regulation, such as under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29
U.S.C.). See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION xi, xiii, 93-114 (revised ed. 2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (explaining that
shareholders' rights "are particularly important" for protecting investors). Whereas convergence
theory and the 'law matters" hypothesis assumed that common law jurisdictions provide
superior protection for shareholders, the Paulson Committee challenged this proposition in the
U.S. context. The Committee stated that "[o]verall, shareholders of U.S. companies have fewer
rights . . . than do their foreign competitors," and expressed concern that inadequate shareholder
protection might deter corporations from entering U.S. public markets. Id. at 16.
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These initial proponents of shareholder empowerment may see
some of their hopes realized through regulatory responses to the
global financial crisis. Prospective reforms under consideration
include legislation for a Shareholder Bill of Rights38 and a proposed
SEC Rule 14a-11, 39 which would grant shareholders access to the
company's proxy materials to nominate directors. 40 The reaction to
these proposals has been both polarized and intense: some have
strongly supported the Shareholder Bill of Rights,41 while others have
condemned the proposal on the basis that it will exacerbate short-
termism and the problem of predatory investors.42  Both the
Shareholder Bill of Rights and proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 have also
38. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009) available at
http://law.du.eduldocuments/corporate-governancellegislation/bill-text-shareholders-bill-of-
rights-act-of-2009.pdf ('[P]rovid[ing] shareholders with enhanced authority over the nomination,
election and compensation of public company executives"). The proposed legislation was
introduced by U.S. Democrat Senators, Charles Schumer and Maria Cantwell on May 19, 2009.
Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Schumer, Cantwell Announce 'S'holder Bill of Rights' to
Impose Greater Accountability on Corp. Am. (May 19, 2009). The legislation is aimed at
increasing shareholder powers as an antidote to excessive risk-taking and executive
compensation. Id. Key provisions include the following: (i) a mandatory annual nonbinding
shareholder vote on executive compensation in public companies; (ii) instruction to the SEC to
issue rules permitting shareholders wishing to nominate a director to have access to the
company's proxy in certain circumstances; (iii) the introduction of a majority, rather than
plurality, voting rule for uncontested director elections; (iv) the elimination of staggered boards;
(v) a requirement for separation of the position of CEO and Chairman of the Board in public
companies; and (vi) a requirement that public company boards have a risk committee. Id.
39. SEC commissioners voted, in a 3-2 split along party lines, to propose SEC Rule 14a-11
on May 20, 2009. See Elizabeth Bennett, SEC Votes to Propose Shareholder Proxy Access Rule, 12
DEL. L. WKLY., June 3, 2009, at 1; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to
Propose Rule Amendments to Facilitate Rights of S'holders to Nominate Directors (May 20,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm.
40. See Sarah N. Lynch, Watchdog Backs Greater Power for Shareholders, WALL ST. J. ASIA
(Hong Kong), May 22, 2009, at M4 (specifying the conditions under which shareholders would be
eligible for access to proxy materials under the proposed reform); Nathan, supra note 10
(explaining the effect of the proposed reforms on shareholder proxy access).
41. See Anne Simpson, America's Governance Revolution Must Not Be Ducked, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 26, 2009, at 9 (observing "political momentum behind the proposals"); Press
Release, Schumer, supra note 38 (explaining that the proposed Shareholder Bill of Rights is
"supported by nearly 20 major pension funds, labor unions, and consumer groups," including
AFL-CIO, AFSCME, and CalPERS).
42. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Jay W. Lorsch & Theodore N. Mirvis, Schumer's Shareholder
Bill Misses the Mark, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at A15; Lawrence Mitchell, Protect Industry
from Predatory Speculators, FIN. TIMES (London), July 9, 2009, at 9 (stating that "[sihareholder
rights are simply wrong"); see also Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber
Issues Study Showing Politically Driven Union Activism Hurts S'holders: Raises Questions about
Schumer S'holder Activism Legislation (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/
press/releases/2009/may/090519_activism.htm.
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been criticized for contributing to the further federalization of
corporate law.4 3
Few academic commentators in the United States seem to
doubt that there is "ample room for increasing shareholder power"
under U.S. corporate law.4 4 Nonetheless, they have presented a range
of arguments as to why shareholder empowerment would constitute a
dangerous deviation from established, and near-sacrosanct, corporate
law principles. 45 These include arguments that shareholder
disempowerment is not a cause for concern, but rather a positive
attribute of U.S. corporate law, and that granting stronger powers to
shareholders would encourage them to engage in predatory and self-
interested behavior.46 Under this critique, traditional discourse about
protection of investors has given way to discourse about protection of
the corporation from investors.47
Some commentators have criticized shareholder empowerment
from an evolutionary/efficiency perspective, asking why, if shareholder
empowerment is a valuable corporate governance attribute, we do not
already see it in the marketplace. 48 While this is an intriguing
43. See Press Release, Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Statement on Senator
Schumer's Proposed S'holder Bill of Rights Act (May 20, 2009), available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/2009.05.19.Schumer%2OStatement.pdf;
Paredes, supra note 15; see also Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber
Comments on SEC S'holder Access Proposal: Cites Growing Evidence that Union Activism
Schemes Would Harm Investors (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.
com/press/releases/2009/may/090520_sec.htm. It now appears that the SEC has deferred its
decision on proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 until early 2010. See Sarah N. Lynch, Activists, Take
Note: SEC Delays a Proxy Vote, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2009, at B3.
44. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 569 (2006); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93
VA. L. REV. 789, 789-90 (2007) (agreeing with Bebchuk that "shareholder control is largely a
myth in public companies today"); cf. Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian
Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 734 (2007) (proposing that 'the myth of the shareholder franchise'
is no myth at all").
45. For criticism of the shareholder empowerment proposals, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735-36 (2006);
Lipton & Savitt, supra note 44, at 734; Stout, supra note 44, at 789-92; Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution for
Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1759-60 (2006).
46. For a detailed analysis of the central arguments against shareholder empowerment
found in the academic literature, see Jennifer G. Hill, The Rising Tension Between Shareholder
and Director Power in the Common Law World, CORP. GOVERNANCE: IN'TL REV. (forthcoming
2010) (analyzing a variety of types of criticism against shareholder empowerment proposals).
47. Robert C. Clark, Opening Comments, Corporate Separateness, Sixth Annual Law and
Business Conference at Vanderbilt University (Mar. 31, 2006).
48. See Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 1736-37 ("[W]hen firms do not offer specific
governance terms, we may infer that such items are not attractive to investors."); Lipton &
Savitt, supra note 44, at 743-44 (criticizing Bebchuk's argument that the costs of shareholder
empowerment would be "worth paying"); Strine, supra note 45, at 1774 ("If such measures really
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question with respect to U.S. corporate law, it is a less persuasive
argument from a comparative corporate governance perspective, as
the facts of News Corp."s reincorporation show.
The events surrounding the reincorporation of News Corp.49
have significant implications for both convergence theory and the
shareholder empowerment debate. Contrary to the argument of
several critics of shareholder empowerment that the dearth of
shareholder participatory rights under U.S. corporate law provides
evidence that they are neither desired nor valued by investors,50
background events to News Corp.'s exodus from Australia to Delaware
present another picture. They demonstrate that shareholder rights,
and the extent to which they are valued, differ considerably within the
common law world. The News Corp. story also challenges claims to the
inevitability of the U.S. system of corporate governance,5 1 which are
implicit in evolutionary/efficiency arguments favoring the regulatory
status quo. The circumstances surrounding the reincorporation show
that other common law countries have in fact chosen to allocate power
between shareholders and management in quite a different way than
Delaware law. The News Corp. reincorporation story brings into sharp
focus the attitudinal conflict over the rights of shareholders, which has
so far tended to play out in a more abstract sense in the media and
academic circles. 52
The issue of the balance of power between shareholders and
the board of directors came to the fore in Australia following News
Corp.'s 2004 announcement signaling its intention to shift domicile
from Australia to Delaware, to obtain primary listing on the New York
Stock Exchange, and to seek inclusion in the Standard & Poor's 500
Index ("S&P 500").53 The reincorporation proposal, which involved
destroy value over the long term, then one would expect investors to demand different
charters."). A more recent variant of this argument is that since we are starting to see provisions
empowering shareholders in the U.S. marketplace, there is no need for mandatory rules in this
regard. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 15. Paredes notes that in April 2009, the Delaware
legislature introduced a new section 112, which authorizes bylaws to grant shareholders access
to the corporation's proxy materials for nomination of directors. Id.
49. Prior to the reincorporation, the Australian entity was known as The News Corporation
Limited. See Press Release, News Corp., News Corp. Plans to Reincorporate in the U.S. (Apr. 6,
2004), available at http://www.newscorp.com/news/news_207.html.
50. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 1737; Stout, supra note 44, at 801-03.
51. See also Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate
Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 378 (1996) (discussing comparative corporate governance
developments in the early 1990s, which had a similar effect).
52. See, e.g., Battling for Corporate America - Shareholder Democracy, ECONOMIST, Mar.
11, 2006, at 75. See generally Hill, supra note 46.
53. See NEWS CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 4-5 (2004), available at http://www.newscorp.com
[Report2004/2004_annual-report.pdff Grant Samuel & Assocs., Re-incorporation of The News
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incorporating a new parent company in the United States, was to be
implemented by schemes of arrangement, 54 which rely on both
shareholder consent and court approval under Australian law.55
According to News Corp., the move to the United States, where
most of its operations were based,56 was prompted by legitimate
commercial goals, including the desire to gain greater access to U.S.
capital markets and to enhance shareholder value.57 Critics of the
proposal argued, however, that the purpose of the reincorporation was
to strengthen managerial power vis-A-vis shareholder power within
News Corp. They claimed that Delaware law provided less protection
for minority shareholders than Australian corporate law, enabling the
Murdoch family to entrench its interests more easily in the United
States.55 In contrast to the Paulson Committee's concern that minimal
shareholder rights might deter corporations from entering U.S. public
markets, 59 these critics claimed that this feature of Delaware law
constituted its main allure for News Corp.
An independent expert's report,60 prepared by Grant Samuel &
Associates on behalf of News Corp., found that the reincorporation
Corporation Ltd in the United States and Acquisition of Queensland Press Pty Ltd, in
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM IN RELATION TO A PROPOSAL TO "RE-INCORPORATE" IN THE UNITED
STATES AND TO ACQUIRE FROM MURDOCH FAMILY INTERESTS THEIR SHAREHOLDING IN
QUEENSLAND PRESS PTY. LIMITED E1, E1-E4 (Sept. 14, 2004) (outlining the details of the
reincorporation and explaining that it "is in the best interests of News Corporation shareholders
as a whole"); News Corp. Prepares for U.S. Transfer, Listing on S&P 500, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27,
2004, at 1.
54. See News Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 2.01 (Nov. 12, 2004) (setting out
the structure of the reorganization of the Australian corporation, The News Corporation
Limited).
55. Schemes of arrangement are regulated under Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act, 2001
(Austl.). For an overview of the scheme of arrangement procedure in Australia, see TONY DAMIAN
& ANDREW RICH, SCHEMES, TAKEOVERS AND HIMALAYAN PEAKS: THE USE OF SCHEMES OF
ARRANGEMENT TO EFFECT CHANGE OF CONTROL TRANSACTIONS 8-19 (2004).
56. Approximately 70 percent of the group's revenues and 80 percent of profits were derived
from the United States at the time of the reincorporation proposal. Grant Samuel & Assocs.,
supra note 53, at E-3.
57. NEWS CORP., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 4. For other perceived benefits, see
Press Release, News Corp., Australian Federal Court Approves S'holder Meetings to Vote on
Proposed Reincorporation 2 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.newscorp.cominews
/news_216.html.
58. See, e.g., Elizabeth Knight, Murdoch Gymnastics Good for Investors, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Oct. 8, 2004, at 25 (stating "[w]hat we will never know is the extent to which this move
offshore was motivated by the potential re-rating or the deterioration of minorities' rights and
the enhancement of Murdoch family control. Was the latter the prime aim or just a collateral
gain?"); see also Ben Power & Neil Chenoweth, Funds Lash News Corp's US Move, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., Sept. 28, 2004, at 1.
59. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 37, at 16.
60. Although an independent expert's report is only required where a party to a corporate
reconstruction is entitled to at least 30 percent of the voting shares, see Corporations
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proposal was in the best interests of the company's shareholders as a
whole, 61 but it nonetheless acknowledged the possibility of a reduction
of minority shareholder rights. The report stated that "the costs,
disadvantages and risks are not inconsequential but do not outweigh
the advantages."62 The Federal Court of Australia, in its subsequent
approval of the schemes of arrangement implementing the proposal,
noted that these advantages related mainly to the market for News
Corp. shares and involved "judgments rather than propositions that
can be empirically verified."63
In late July 2004, two institutional investor organizations, the
Australian Council of Super Investors, Inc. ("ACSI")64 and Corporate
Governance International Pty. Ltd. ("CGI")65 met with News Corp. to
discuss a range of corporate governance concerns relating to the effect
of the reincorporation proposal on shareholder rights.66 ACSI and CGI,
which had the support of several major international institutional
investors,67 subsequently launched a corporate governance campaign
urging News Corp. to transplant certain Australian shareholder
protection provisions into its prospective Delaware charter.
As part of this campaign, ACSI and CGI drafted a document
dealing with corporate governance-the so-called "Governance
Article"68-which they provided to News Corp. with a request that its
Regulations, 2001, R. 8303 & 8306, pt. 3, sched. 8 (Austl.), the provision of such a report to
members in a scheme of arrangement is standard commercial practice in Australia. See generally
DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 55, at 11.
61. Where required, an independent expert's report must state whether, in the expert's
opinion, the proposed scheme is in the best interests of the members and must set out reasons for
that opinion. Corporations Regulations, 2001, R. 8303, pt. 3, sched. 8 (Austl.).
62. See Grant Samuel & Assocs., supra note 53, at E-126; see also id. at E-10 to E-13
(outlining further possible disadvantages for shareholders, particularly minority shareholders).
63. Re News Corp. (2004) 51 A.C.S.R. 394, 3 (Austl.) (per Hely, J.).
64. ACSI is a not-for-profit organization formed in 2001 to provide independent research
and education services to superannuation funds. See Welcome - ACSI, http://www.acsi.org.
auldsp about.cfm (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
65. CGI was formed in 1993, and provided proxy analysis and voting recommendations to
institutional investors. CGI combined with Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, in 2006 and is now known
as CGI Glass Lewis. See Press Release, CGI Glass Lewis (Sept. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.glasslewis.com/downloads/535-52.pdf.
66. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2005).
67. For example, the Global Institutional Governance Network, comprising institutional
investors such as British Hermes in the United Kingdom and CalPERS in the United States,
supported ACSI and CGI. See Stephen Bartholomeusz, Activists Confront News on World Stage,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 28, 2004, at 22; Power & Chenoweth, supra note 58, at 1.
68. News Corp. Group, Governance Article for New Delaware Parent Company:
Preservation of Australian Public Investor Protection & Empowerment Provisions (2004) (on file
with author).
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contents be included in News Corp.'s Delaware charter. 69 The
Governance Article included a large number of Australian statutory
provisions and "best practice" procedures. Its purpose was expressed
to be:
(i) To preserve, in the constitution of this new Delaware incorporated Company and for
the benefit of those public investors, key Australian investor protection and
empowerment provisions....
(ii) To render inapplicable, for the benefit of those public investors, certain presumptions
of Delaware/US law and practice which are contrary to key Australian investor
protection and empowerment provisions, and
(iii) To include, in the constitution of this new Delaware incorporated Company and for
the benefit of those public investors, other key elements of Australian and international
best practice in corporate governance.
7 0
Initially, News Corp. made no concessions to the institutional
investors' demands.7' Echoing the arguments of Montesquieu, 72 the
acknowledged father of comparative law, News Corp. claimed that the
selective transplantation of Australian governance principles into the
constitution of a Delaware-incorporated company would limit access to
U.S. institutional investor capital, confuse investors, and put the
corporation at a competitive disadvantage with regard to its U.S.
competitors, such as Viacom and Disney.73
Following News Corp.'s refusal to adopt the Governance
Article, ACSI issued a critical press release entitled "News
Corporation settles for second best on governance."74 By late
September 2004, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. ("ISS"),76 the
largest U.S. proxy adviser, entered the fray, adding its voice to calls
for News Corp. to adopt certain Australian corporate governance
standards. 76 It appears that U.S. institutions held around 21 percent
of ordinary shares and 35 percent of preference shares in News Corp.,
69. The Governance Article was sent to News Corp. on August 20, 2004. See UniSuper Ltd.,
2005 WL 3529317, at *1 n.8.
70. Governance Article, supra note 68, at cl. 2.
71. See Press Release, ACSI, News Corporation Settles for Second Best on Governance 1
(Sept. 27, 2004).
72. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 7 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent
trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1748). Montesquieu warned against the unpredictability
and dangers inherent in transplanting elements of one legal system to another.
73. See Ben Power, News Won't Compromise, Says Murdoch, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 29,
2004, at 16.
74. See Press Release, ACSI, supra note 71.
75. ISS was acquired by RiskMetrics Group in 2007. See RiskMetrics Group Completes
Acquisition of Institutional Shareholder Services, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 11, 2007.
76. See Tim Burt, News Corp in Talks to Avert Revolt, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 2004,
at 29; Ben Power, News Faces Crucial Test on US Move, AusTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 27, 2004, at 17,
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and that approximately 20 to 30 percent of U.S. institutional investors
received advice from ISS.77 Rupert Murdoch's family interests
controlled approximately 30 percent of News Corp.'s voting stock.78
News Corp.'s public shareholders were in a position to prevent the
reorganization by virtue of the fact that Australian law required the
schemes of arrangement to be approved by separate class resolutions,
with the Murdoch family voting as a separate class. 79
III. THE NEWS CORP. CONCESSIONS
No victory is final and no coalition of support ever solid.
- George E. Reedyso
In October 2004, News Corp. resiled from its earlier rejection of
the institutional investors' demands81 and agreed to incorporate some
shareholder protection provisions into its Delaware charter. 82 The
agreed charter amendments related to five main areas of corporate
governance over which the institutional investors had expressed
concern: the securities exchange listing rules, super-voting shares,
shareholder meetings and voting, takeovers, and best practice
principles.83
77. See Malcolm Maiden, Dominant US Interests the Key to Rupert's Backflip, AGE
(Melbourne), Oct. 7, 2004, at 1.
78. Martin Peers, News Corp. Strengthens its Takeover Defenses, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004,
at A2. For a discussion of some of the distinctive corporate governance problems and challenges
associated with family controlled public companies, including News Corp., see Deborah A.
DeMott, Guests at the Table?: Independent Directors in Family-Influenced Public Companies, 33
J. CORP. L. 819 (2008).
79. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec.
20, 2005). The reincorporation proposal required approval of schemes of arrangement by News
Corp.'s ordinary and preference shareholders and option holders, and approval by shareholders
of a capital reduction under Australian law. See generally Corporations Act, 2001, § 411(4)
(Austl.). Federal Court approval of the transactions, which was also required under Australian
law, was given on November 3, 2004 in Re News Corp. (2004) 51 A.C.S.R. 394, when Justice Hely
made orders approving the schemes under § 411(4)(b). Under this procedure, shareholders and
option holders effectively exchanged their shares and options in News Corp. for shares and
options in News Corp. US. See generally Press Release, News Corp., Australian Federal Court
Approves News Corp. Reincorporation to U.S. (Nov. 3, 2004); Trevor Sykes, Murdoch Bows out. .
But He'll Still Visit, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Oct. 27, 2004, at 1.
80. George E. Reedy, The Vocabulary of Presidents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1973, at 33.
81. On October 1, 2004, News Corp. commenced further negotiations with ACSI. See
UniSuper Ltd., 2005 WL 3529317, at *2.
82. See Letter from News Corp. to Shareholders and Optionholders (Oct. 7, 2004), available
at http://www.newscorp.com/investor/download/SupplementlMCorpGov.pdf; Press Release,
ACSI, News Corporation Yields to Investor Concerns (Oct. 7, 2004).
83. See generally UniSuper Ltd., 2005 WL 3529317, at *2.
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A. Securities Exchange Listing Rules
First, the Governance Article had included a number of specific
investor protection provisions of the Australian Securities Exchange
("ASX") Listing Rules, 84 which institutional investors sought to
incorporate into News Corp.'s Delaware charter.85 News Corp. did not
accede to this specific demand.86 Rather, it agreed to include a
provision in the charter stating that News Corp. would not request
removal of full foreign listing from the ASX without majority
shareholder approval.87 Although its primary listing was on the New
York Stock Exchange after the reincorporation,8 8 News Corp.'s
concession that it would retain full foreign listing on the ASX 89
ensured that all the ASX Listing Rules and corporate governance
guidelines would continue to apply to the company. 90
At first blush, this appeared to be a major concession. The ASX
Listing Rules are relatively stringent by international standards and
employ shareholder consent as a legitimating device in a wide range of
84. At the time of the reincorporation, these rules were called the Australian Stock
Exchange Listing Rules.
85. The institutional investors' Governance Article deemed certain specified "public investor
protection and empowerment provisions" under the ASX Listing Rules to be included within it.
The ASX Listing Rules specified were Rules 7.1-7.9 (requiring shareholder approval for new
share issues exceeding 15 percent of capital); Rules 10.1-10.18 (requiring shareholder consent
for transactions between the corporation and persons in a position of influence); Rules 14.2
(requirements for proxy form); 14.2A (rights of CHESS Depositary Interest holders); 14.3
(requirements regarding nomination of directors); 14.4-14.5 (requirements regarding election
and rotation of directors); and 14.11 (voting exclusion statements). See Governance Article, supra
note 68, at cl. 7.
86. UniSuper Ltd., 2005 WL 3529317, at *1-2.
87. Under the charter provision, News Corp. cannot request removal of full foreign listing
from the ASX without the affirmative vote of a majority of all listed shares in the corporation,
rather than simply a majority of shares voted on the resolution. See News Corp., Current Report
(Form 8-K), Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of News Corporation, Inc., at art.
IV, § 4(a)(iv)(1) (Nov. 12, 2004).
88. News Corp. obtained secondary listing on both the ASX and the London Stock
Exchange. News Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 2.01 (Nov. 12, 2004).
89. The full foreign listing adopted by News Corp. is distinguishable from "foreign exempt
listing" under the ASX Listing Rules. Foreign exempt listing requirements are far less onerous
than full ASX listing. Companies admitted to ASX foreign exempt listing are required merely to
satisfy the ASX that they comply with the listing rules of their home overseas exchange, not with
ASX Listing Rules themselves. See ASX Listing Rules, at R. 1.11, Condition 3, and R. 1.11-1.15,
available at http://www.asx.com.aulsupervision/rules-guidance/listing-rules1.htm. By way of
contrast, the full foreign listing adopted by News Corp. prima facie carried an obligation to
comply with all ASX Listing Rules.
90. See Press Release, ACSI, News Corp Yields to Investor Concerns (Oct. 7, 2004) (on file
with author); Letter from News Corp. to Shareholders and Optionholders, supra note 82 (stating
"No removal of full foreign listing on the ASX without shareholder approval").
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circumstances.91 In particular, the rules impede the use of
entrenchment mechanisms that are permitted in many other
jurisdictions, such as dual class stock 92 and poison pills. 93 The ASX
Listing Rules are given statutory backing under the Australian
Corporations Act of 2001 ("Corporations Act"). Following a failure to
comply, these rules are enforceable in court on the application of the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC"), the
ASX, or "a person aggrieved" by the breach.94 Where the purpose of a
listing rule is to protect shareholders, an individual shareholder may
have standing to enforce the rule as a person aggrieved.95
Nonetheless, there was a crucial difference between the
institutional investors' original demand that News Corp. include the
substance of specified ASX Listing Rules in its charter and the
concession as finally accepted: the potential for modification of the
rules. Although News Corp.'s agreement to retain full foreign listing
on the ASX meant that the company was required prima facie to
comply fully with the ASX Listing Rules, shareholder protections
could be undermined if the ASX exercised its power to waive
particular rules on behalf of News Corp. 96 This aspect of the
concession would become relevant immediately following News Corp.'s
reincorporation. 9
B. Super-Voting Shares
Second, the institutional investors tried to ensure that News
Corp. would not issue super-voting shares without shareholder
approval after reincorporation. 98 The ASX Listing Rules prohibit
91. Under the ASX Listing Rules, matters which require shareholder approval include: the
issue of more than 15 percent of equity securities (Rule 7.1); the issue of securities during a
takeover bid (Rule 7.9); the disposal of substantial corporate assets to certain associated persons
(Rule 10.1); any increase in fees payable to non-executive directors (Rule 10.17); the conferral of
termination benefits, if the total value of benefits payable to all officers will exceed 5 percent of
equity in the company (Rule 10.19); and the disposal of the main undertaking of the company
(Rule 11.2). ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89.
92. ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, at R. 6.9.
93. Id.at R.7.1.
94. See Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 793C(1),(3), 1101B, 1324 (Austl.).
95. ROBERT P. AuSTIN & IAN M. RAMSAY, FORD'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW
$11.233 (13th ed. 2007).
96. See ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, at Introduction ("ASX may also waive compliance
with a listing rule, or part of a rule, unless the rule in question says otherwise.").
97. As discussed later in the Article, in the week during which News Corp.'s reincorporation
became fully effective, the ASX waived a number of its listing rules on News Corp.'s behalf.
98. See Press Release, ACSI, News Corporation Settles for Second Best on Governance 2
(Sept. 27, 2004) (on file with author) (stating "[t]he fact that the Board can create a further class
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Australian publicly listed corporations from issuing shares with
enhanced voting power unless the ASX waives the rules.99
There was a history to the institutional investors' concern in
this regard. More than a decade earlier, at News Corp.'s 1993 annual
shareholder meeting, Rupert Murdoch had announced a plan to issue
super-voting shares. 100 News Corp. subsequently asked the ASX to
waive the strict "one share, one vote" principle 01 under its rules so the
company could issue shares with differential voting rights.102 The
proposal was widely condemned in Australia as an entrenchment and
anti-takeover device which would erode general shareholder rights.103
Thus, what began as a discrete waiver request by News Corp.
broadened into a general policy debate about the future of the "one
share, one vote" rule for Australian-listed companies. 1 04 Institutional
investor opposition, 05 governmental intervention,106 and public
backlash ultimately led News Corp. to abandon the plan to issue
super-voting shares,107 leading some prescient commentators at the
time to speculate that News Corp. might seek to avoid future
of shares in the United States without shareholder approval is of considerable concern"); Power,
supra note 76, at 17.
99. See ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, at R. 6.9 (mandating a "one share, one vote" rule
in relation to voting on a poll).
100. Sue Lecky, Murdoch Seeks 'Super' Shares, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 13, 1993, at
27.
101. For discussion of the history and economic theory underlying the "one share, one vote"
rule, see Guido Ferrarini, One Share - One Vote: A European Rule? (ECGI, Working Paper No.
58, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875620.
102. News Corp. wrote to the ASX seeking approval to make a bonus issue of super-voting
shares on a one-for-ten basis, with each new share carrying twenty-five votes. See Saul Fridman,
The News Corporation Super Shares Proposal: Crime of the Century or Tempest in a Teapot, 4
AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 184, 184-85 (1994), available at 1994 AJCL LEXIS 9.
103. The deputy managing director of AMP Society, one of Australia's largest institutional
investors, stated at the time, "We believe that the only reason for differential voting rights is to
allow control to be entrenched in the hands of the minority, perhaps in perpetuity." Emiliya
Mychasuk, Industry Says No to News Share Plan, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 30, 1993, at
33; cf. Fridman, supra note 102, at 184-85.
104. See ASX, Discussion Paper on Differential Voting Rights 4-6 (Nov. 1993) (on file with
author); see also Ivor Ries, ASX Opens Up One-vote Debate, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov. 11, 1993, at
64 (arguing that such a change to Australian law would constitute "perhaps the most dramatic
shift in the balance of power in favour of the company management and dominant shareholders
and away from minority shareholders since the first company was set up in this country").
105. See Ivor Ries, Big Guns Open Fire on Murdoch's Super Shares, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov.
30, 1993, at 52. In spite of the opposition of Australian institutional investors to News Corp.'s
super-voting shares proposal, it appeared that U.S. institutional investors were generally
supportive of it. See Brian Hale, US Support for Murdoch Share Plan, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov. 11,
1993, at 23.
106. Tim Dodd & Neil Chenoweth, Govt Steps into Super Share Row, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov.
24, 1993, at 1.
107. News Corp. Plan for New Shares Bows to Pressure, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1993, at All.
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difficulties of this kind by delisting in Australia or reincorporating in a
jurisdiction such as Delaware. 108
In its concessions to the 2004 reincorporation campaign by
institutional investors, News Corp. agreed to include a provision in its
Delaware charter prohibiting the issuance of any super-voting shares
absent the approval of a majority of all voting shareholders. 109
C. Shareholder Meetings and Voting
Third, the institutional investors raised the issue of the
disparity between shareholder rights under Australian law and
Delaware law, particularly in the context of shareholder meetings and
voting.110 Accordingly, they included an extensive list of shareholder
protection provisions from the Australian Corporations Act in their
Governance Article."1 These provisions related to matters such as the
convening of shareholder meetings,112 conduct of those meetings, 113
and removal of directors from office.114
108. See, e.g., Ivor Ries, Super-voter Isn't Dead Yet, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 9, 1993, at 48.
109. See News Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of News Corporation, Inc., at art. IV, § 4(a)(iv)(2) (Nov. 12, 2004).
110. UniSuper, 2005 WVL 3529317, at *2.
111. See Governance Article, supra note 68, cl. 5.
112. Relevant provisions of the Corporations Act relating to the convening of meetings,
which appeared in the Governance Article, included: § 249CA (mandatory rule empowering a
single director of a listed company to convene a shareholder meeting); § 249D (provision
requiring directors to convene a shareholder meeting on the request of shareholders with at least
5 percent of votes that may be cast in a general meeting or one hundred members); § 249E
(liability consequences for directors of failing to comply with a valid shareholder request to
convene a shareholder meeting under § 249D); § 249F (power of shareholders with at least 5
percent of votes that may be cast in a general meeting to convene a shareholder meeting to call
and hold a shareholder meeting themselves); and § 249HA (mandatory minimum notice period of
twenty-eight days for shareholder meetings of listed public companies). See id.
113. Relevant provisions of the Corporations Act relating to the conduct of meetings, which
appeared in the Governance Article, included: § 249N (power of shareholders with at least 5
percent of votes that may be cast in a general meeting, or one hundred members, to propose
resolutions at a shareholder meeting); § 2490 (company obligation to give notice of shareholder
resolutions); § 249P (power of shareholders with at least 5 percent of votes, or one hundred
members by number, to require the company to distribute a statement about shareholders'
resolutions to shareholders in certain circumstances); § 250R (requiring a nonbinding
shareholder vote at the annual general meeting on the directors' remuneration report); § 250RA
(requiring the auditor of a listed corporation to attend the company's annual general meeting); §
250SA (requiring reasonable opportunity for shareholder discussion of the remuneration report
at the annual shareholder meeting); § 250T (requiring reasonable opportunity for shareholders
to ask relevant questions of the auditor, if present, at the annual shareholder meeting); and §
251AA (requiring listed companies to disclose proxy votes). See id.
114. Corporations Act, 2001, § 203D (Austl.) (mandatory power of public company
shareholders to remove a director from office by ordinary resolution). The Governance Article
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Several of the Australian provisions included in the
Governance Article merit comment. It included, for example, two
provisions of the Australian Corporations Act granting shareholders
(or "members," as they are otherwise known) the right to convene
company meetings in certain circumstances. The first of these
provisions was § 249D of the Corporations Act, commonly known as
the "one-hundred member rule." This rule requires directors to
convene a meeting upon the request of either members holding at
least 5 percent of a company's voting stock or one hundred members
by number. The second provision was § 249F, which permits
shareholders holding at least 5 percent of a company's voting stock to
convene a meeting directly. The Governance Article also contained the
recently enacted § 250R of the Corporations Act, which requires
shareholders of an Australian-listed company to pass a nonbinding
resolution at their annual meeting approving the directors'
remuneration report.115 Regarding the removal of directors from office,
the Governance Article advocated inclusion of § 203D of the
Corporations Act, granting shareholders of public companies an
absolute right to remove directors from office, with or without cause,
by majority vote.
News Corp. made only one concession in this regard. The
company agreed to include a provision in its Delaware charter
permitting shareholders holding 20 percent or more of Class B
common stock to request a special stockholder meeting. 116 While this
charter provision was more generous to shareholders than Delaware
law (under which they have no prima facie right to convene a special
shareholder meeting), 117 it contained significant qualifications' 18 and
included various other shareholder protection provisions, such as §§ 207-230 (general
requirement of shareholder consent for related party transactions).
115. See generally Larelle Chapple & Blake Christensen, The Non-Binding Vote on Executive
Pay: A Review of the CLERP 9 Reform, 18 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 263 (2005); Jennifer G. Hill,
Regulating Executive Remuneration: International Developments in the Post-Scandal Era, 3 EUR.
COMP. L. 64, 69-72 (2006) (discussing disclosure requirements for executive pay); Kym Sheehan,
Is the Outrage Constraint an Effective Constraint on Executive Remuneration? Evidence from
the UK and Preliminary Results from Australia (Mar. 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=974965).
116. See News Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of News Corporation, Inc., at art. VI (Nov. 12, 2004). Perhaps surprisingly, the
charter did not include a supermajority provision defending the shareholder rights contained in
this provision.
117. Under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(2)(d) (2008), a special meeting of the stockholders
may only be convened by the board or by a person so authorized in the certificate of incorporation
or by the bylaws. Cf. Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 7.02(a)(2) (2008), which prima facie permits
members holding at least 10 percent of votes to convene a special meeting of stockholders. The
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was far less generous than the Australian approach embodied in the
one-hundred member rule and associated provisions described
above.119
D. Takeovers
Fourth, the institutional investors' Governance Article
addressed takeovers. Significant differences exist between the United
States and other common law countries, including Australia, with
respect to the balance of power between shareholders and directors in
takeovers.120 U.S. federal law regulates "tender offers"121 rather than
the concept of "changes of control," which forms the regulatory
fulcrum in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Australia.122
Under U.S. law, assessment of directors' defensive conduct in
takeovers is the province of state law and courts.123 Delaware law, in
spite of the potential for intense scrutiny of directors' defensive tactics
following the Unocal decision, 24 continues to accord great deference to
board decisions under a paradigm in which the board occupies a
"gatekeeper" role.125 Although views differ on whether this gatekeeper
articles of incorporation may fix a lower or higher percentage, though not exceeding 25 percent.
Id.
118. News Corp.'s Delaware charter states, for example, that no special meeting of
stockholders can be called if written notice by the stockholders is received less than 135 days
prior to the first anniversary of the date of the preceding annual meeting of stockholders. News
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of News
Corporation, Inc, at. art. VI (Nov. 12, 2004). The clause also provides that the directors must
convene a special shareholders' meeting not later than one hundred days after receipt of the
stockholders' written request, compared to a twenty-one day deadline for directors under
Australian law. See Corporations Act, 2001, § 249D(5) (Austl.). If the directors fail to convene a
meeting within twenty-one days, a specified proportion of the requisitioning shareholders may
convene the meeting themselves and the company may recover meeting expenses from the
directors personally. Id. §§ 249E(1), 249E(5).
119. Id. §§ 249D, 249F.
120. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 18-22 (2001) (noting the
existence of different regulatory approaches to takeovers within common law jurisdictions).
121. See, e.g., Williams Act, § 14(d)-(e) Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1982)). See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C.
COFFEE, JR., & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1114 (6th ed., 2004).
122. Richard Hall, The Endesa Takeover Battle and its Implications for U.S. Regulation of
Cross-Border M&A Transactions, Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial, Corporate and Takeover
Law Seminar, University of Sydney Law School (Oct. 3, 2007).
123. See, e.g., Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
124. Id.
125. It has been stated that the board acts, not just as a gatekeeper, but rather as "the
defender of the metaphorical medieval corporate bastion and the protector of the corporation's
shareholders." Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 772 (2006) (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
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paradigm in fact promotes shareholder interests,126 the assumption
that board access to defensive tactics is a vital antidote to coercive
bids continues to have strong traction in U.S. corporate law
scholarship. 127
In the United Kingdom, takeover disputes are resolved not by
the courts but by a specialized non-judicial body, the Panel on
Takeovers and Mergers ("the U.K. Panel"),128 which is responsible for
administering the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers ("the City
Code"). The operation of the U.K. Panel reflects a self-regulatory
approach to takeovers and has served as the blueprint for reform in
numerous jurisdictions, including Australia, Hong Kong, Ireland, and
South Africa.129 The U.K. approach has thus far been characterized by
an extremely low incidence of tactical litigation compared to the
United States.130 Some of the contours of U.K. takeover regulation
were altered recently to implement the Directive on Takeover Bids
("the Directive") under European Community law.11
1387-88 (Del. 1995)); Robert B. Thompson, Takeover Regulation after the 'Convergence' of
Corporate Law, 24 SYD. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (2002).
126. See, e.g., Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in REINIER KRAAKMAN, PAUL
DAVIES, HENRY HANSMANN, GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS J. HoPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK,
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 157, 172 (2004)
(arguing that it is difficult to justify the Delaware takeover law model as an efficient regulatory
regime for agency problems in the takeover context); cf. Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 787 n.82
(arguing that insulation of board authority is a critical factor in promoting efficient corporate
decision-making for the benefit of shareholders).
127. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33
J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2007) (stating that it would be "crazy from an investor's perspective for a target
board not to have a traditional pill in place to stimulate a value-enhancing auction and to deter
structurally coercive bids").
128. The U.K. Panel was established in 1968, the same year that the Williams Act was
passed in the U.S. Membership of the U.K. Panel is drawn from major financial and business
institutions. See The Takeover Panel, Membership of the Panel, http://www.thetakeoverpanel
org.uk/structure/panel-membership (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
129. See Emma Armson, Models for Takeover Dispute Resolution: Australia and the UK, 5 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 401, 402 (2005).
130. Tunde I. Ogowewo, Tactical Litigation in Takeover Contests, J. BUS. L. 589, 607-09
(2007).
131. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12. Thus, for example, the U.K. Panel has
been designated as the supervisory authority for the purposes of the Directive. Whereas
previously takeover regulation in the United Kingdom had no direct statutory force, the
introduction of Part 28 of the U.K. Companies Act 2006, which implements the Directive on
Takeover Bids, now provides a statutory basis for takeover regulation in the United Kingdom for
the first time. See generally Ogowewo, supra note 130, at 590-92. The U.K. Government
expressed concern that the new legal framework created by the Takeovers Directive might
potentially increase the level of tactical litigation in the United Kingdom. See DEP'T OF TRADE &
IND., COMPANY LAW IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON TAKEOVER BIDS: A
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In contrast to Delaware's deference to board discretion, the
City Code seriously restricts the ability of the board to engage in
defensive tactics and implement entrenching mechanisms. It elevates
shareholder decisionmaking power during a takeover, 132 an approach
which also underpins recent European Community developments in
takeover law.133 A central feature of the City Code is the "frustrating
action" principle, which prohibits directors, in the absence of
shareholder approval, from taking any action that may result in
frustration of a bona fide offer or in the shareholders being denied the
opportunity to decide an offer on its merits. 134 Some scholars argue
that differences in the prevailing paradigms in the U.K. and U.S.
context are attributable to the stronger influence of institutional
investors under the U.K. self-regulatory regime than in the United
States, where the balance of power is firmly tilted towards
management. 135
Australia's takeover laws also diverge from the Delaware
approach and have been described as "unique" and "widely regarded
as some of the most restrictive among capitalist economies." 136 They
are explicitly based on policies of equality of opportunity and
protection of minority shareholders, which are embodied in the so-
called "Eggleston principles."137 The basic rule under Australian
takeover law, which has a historical focus on fairness rather than
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 9 (Jan. 2005) (U.K.), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/
files/file10384.pdf.
132. See Davies & Hopt, supra note 126, at 164.
133. DEP'T OF TRADE & IND., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON TAKEOVER
BIDS: GUIDANCE ON CHANGES TO THE RULES ON COMPANY TAKEOVERS 4 (revised ed. Feb. 2007)
(U.K.), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file37429.pdf; Davies & Hopt, supra note 126, at
164; Peer Zumbansen, European Corporate Law and National Divergences: The Case of Takeover
Regulation, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL. STUD. L. REV. 867, 869--70 (2004).
134. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, R. 21 (U.K.). Examples of frustrating actions are
set out in Rule 21 and include matters such as: issuing new shares; granting options over
unissued shares; creating securities that carry rights of conversion into shares; selling or
acquiring assets of a material amount, and entering into contracts otherwise than in the
ordinary course of business. Id. at R. 21. 1(a)-(b).
135. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 5, at 1727 (noting that, "[i]nstitutional shareholders
played a far greater role in the development of U.K. takeover regulation than in the United
States," and "[i]n the United States, federalism has amplified the voice of corporate managers").
136. Justin Mannolini, Convergence or Divergence: Is There a Role for the Eggleston
Principles in a Global M&A Environment?, 24 SYD. L. REV. 336, 336 (2002).
137. The Eggleston Principles are embedded in Corporations Act, 2001, § 602 (Austl.), which
outlines the purposes of the Chapter in the Act that governs takeovers. The provision includes a
purpose that "as far as practicable" the holders of voting shares "all have a reasonable and equal
opportunity to participate in any benefits" accruing from the acquisition of a substantial interest.
Id. § 602(c); see also Mannolini, supra note 136, at 337-38.
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economic efficiency, 138 is that a bidder cannot acquire control of a
parcel of 20 percent or more of a company's voting shares, except
pursuant to a general offer to all shareholders (the "20 percent
threshold rule"). 139 Private control transactions are thus precluded. By
requiring a bidder to make an offer to all shareholders before it is
permitted to pass the control threshold, Australian takeover law
ensures that majority and minority shareholders share equally any
control premium. This rule is particularly strict in comparison to some
international regimes, such as U.K. law, which permit private control
transactions 140 provided that a general offer or "mandatory bid" is
subsequently made to all shareholders. 1 4 1
Australian law moved closer to U.K. law in 2000, when
responsibility for the resolution of takeover disputes shifted from the
courts to the Australian Takeovers Panel.142 Although Australian
courts traditionally adopted a fiduciary duty analysis to assess
directors' defensive conduct, the Australian Takeovers Panel diverged
sharply from this approach by implementing its own "frustrating
action" policy. 143 This policy focused on the effect, rather than the
purpose, of directors' conduct in response to a takeover,144 and limited
permissible action by the board in the absence of shareholder
138. Mannolini, supra note 136, at 338.
139. See Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 606(1), 611(10) (Austl.).
140. Under Rule 9.1(a) of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (U.K.), the relevant
control threshold is 30 percent of voting shares. City Code on Takeover and Mergers, supra note
134, at R. 9.1(a).
141. Mannolini, supra note 136, at 357-58.
142. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 6.10, div. 2 (Austl.). The policy basis for this change was the
perception that there was widespread use of tactical litigation in the Australian context. See
Ogowewo, supra note 130, at 602-03. Note that the Australian Takeovers Panel has recently
been the subject of a High Court constitutional challenge. See generally Emma Armson, Before
the High Court: Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v Alinta Limited: Will the Takeovers Panel
Survive Constitutional Challenge?, 29 SYD. L. REV. 495, 496 (2007) (observing that the primary
issue is whether the Panel has been given judicial powers of the Commonwealth in violation of
the Constitution). The High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Takeovers Panel's
powers in a judgment delivered on 13 December 2007. Attorney-General (Cth) v. Alinta Ltd.
(2008) 233 C.L.R. 542 (Austl.).
143. The frustrating action policy arises from the reasonable and equal opportunity principle
under Corporations Act, 2001, § 602(c) (Austl.). Emma Armson, The Frustrating Action Policy:
Shifting Power in the Takeover Context, 21 COMP. & SEC. L.J. 487, 487 (2003); Takeovers Panel,
Guidance Note 12: Frustrating Action 2-3 (2003), http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/Guidance
_Notes/Current/downloads/GN12_2003.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
144. See Jennifer G. Hill, Back to the Future? Bigshop 2 and Defensive Tactics in Takeovers,
20 COMP. & SEC. L.J. 126, 129-30 (2002).
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consent.145 It constituted a major shift in the balance of power between
the board and shareholders during a bid under Australian law. 146
There has been increasing recognition of the extent of variation
in international takeover regulation. Academic commentators have
explored possible reasons for the "peculiar divergence" between U.S.
and U.K. takeover rules. 147 U.S. courts have acknowledged this
diversity in international takeover regulation.148 Takeovers also
constituted an important theme in the Paulson Committee report. The
committee compared the "pro-shareholder" approach of the U.K.
regulatory regime with the "pro-management" approach of the
Delaware courts, and recommended certain reforms to the U.S. system
to shift more power to shareholders.' 4 9
The institutional investors' Governance Article addressed the
takeover issue by advocating that News Corp.'s Delaware charter
include the 20 percent threshold rule found in Australian takeover law
to ensure that any control premium would be shared between all
stockholders.15 0 Furthermore, the Governance Article tackled the issue
of defensive conduct by the board of directors.' 5' Clause 8.1 of the
Governance Article contained a general limitation on the board's
power in relation to corporate control transactions.152 It also included
145. See id. at 126; Jennifer G. Hill & Jeremy Kriewaldt, Theory and Practice in Takeover
Law - Further Reflections on Pinnacle No. 8, 19 COMP. & SEC. L.J. 391, 391 (2001) (suggesting
that the shareholder consent limitations "in effect bypassed the need to determine issues of
breach of duty."); Thompson, supra note 125, at 326.
146. According to the Australian Takeovers Panel, "[a]lthough it is generally the
responsibility of a company's directors to make company decisions, decisions about control and
ownership of the company are properly made by its shareholders." Takeovers Panel, supra note
143, at 1.
147. See generally Armour & Skeel, supra note 5, at 1765-84 (concluding that "starkly
different approaches to takeover regulation in the United States and United Kingdom have been
influenced by their characteristic modes of rule-production: courts have been the principal
regulators in the United States, whereas self-regulation shaped by institutional shareholders
prevails in the United Kingdom").
148. See, for example, the recent case of E.On AG v. Acciona, SA., No. 06 Civ. 8720(DLC),
2007 WL316874 316874, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2007). In this case, which concerned a C47
billion hostile takeover in Madrid, the court warned of the need for caution in applying U.S.
takeover principles in cross-border acquisitions, where the acquirer may be acting in compliance
with the laws of its home jurisdiction. Id.
149. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 37, at 93-105.
150. Governance Article, supra note 68, cl. 6, at 3.
151. Id. cl. 8, at 4.
152. Clause 8.1 of the Governance Article stated that
[t]he Board shall not have power to, and shall not, restrict, limit or hinder in
any way the opportunity and capacity of shareholders to decide whether or
not control of the Company should pass under any takeover bid which may be
made in compliance with Delaware law and New York Stock Exchange listing
requirements. For the avoidance of doubt, this provision applies throughout
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a provision expressly stating that "the Board shall not have power to,
and shall not, create or implement any device, matter or thing the
purpose, nature or effect of which is commonly described as a 'poison
pill.' "153
In the takeover context, as in other areas, News Corp. made
some concessions but did not agree to all of the institutional investors'
requests. It was agreed, for example, that the Murdoch interests
would be subject to restrictions analogous to the Australian 20 percent
threshold rule under a series of voting agreements. 154 Subject to
specified "permitted transfers," the Murdoch interests were prohibited
from acquiring more than an additional 3 percent of News Corp.'s
outstanding shares every six months. 55 News Corp. also accepted a
restriction on the board's power to issue poison pills.156 However, this
restriction was contained not in the charter, as the institutional
investors had requested, but rather in a board policy.15 7 The ostensible
reason for this was logistical constraints.15 8 News Corp. issued a press
release and letter to shareholders announcing that the board of the
new Delaware corporation had "established a policy that if any
stockholder rights plan (known as a 'poison pill') is adopted without
stockholder approval, it will expire after one year unless it is ratified
by stockholders."159
E. Best Practice Principles
Finally, the institutional investors' Governance Article
included a number of best practice principles derived from Australian




154. See Letter from News Corp. to Shareholders and Optionholders, supra note 82, at app. I
(b); see also id. § 4 (summarizing the "Restrictions on the rights of the Murdoch interests to
acquire further shares, and to transfer existing shares, in News Corp US").
155. Id. app. (a).
156. UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2005).
157. Id.
158. During negotiations, News Corp.'s General Counsel, Ian Phillip, told the President of
ACSI, Michael O'Sullivan, that it would not be possible, in the limited time available before the
shareholder vote on the corporate reconstruction, to draft and finalize an appropriate charter
restriction on poison pills. Id. at *2.
159. Letter from News Corp. to Shareholders and Optionholders, supra note 82, § 5, at 2
(describing "Board policy on stockholder rights plans"); see also Press Release, News Corp., News
Corp. Adopts Additional Corp. Governance Provisions 2 (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.hoovers.com/free/co/secdoc.xhtml?ID=41816&ipage=3215955.
2010]1 27
28 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1:1
and international corporate governance. 160 These issues included
standards of independence for board members, disclosure of the
company's process for determining leadership succession, procedures
for assessing reasonable shareholder proposals, and elimination of the
company's staggered board structure.161 News Corp. did not agree to
include these provisions in its Delaware charter. 162 It did, however,
agree to establish board committees "to consider" certain corporate
governance issues prior to the company's first annual meeting under
Delaware law.163
The adoption of the various concessions previously discussed
quelled the corporate governance revolt by institutional investors. 164
At News Corp.'s general meeting in October 2004,165 shareholders
overwhelmingly approved the reincorporation proposal, with over 90
percent of votes cast in its favor.166
Although News Corp.'s concessions were far more limited than
the institutional investors' original demands in the Governance
Article,167 the compromise was generally portrayed in the Australian
financial press as a significant victory for the institutional
investors.168 One commentator, for example, described the News Corp.
concessions as heralding "a major step forward" for shareholder
democracy;169 others, however, viewed them as inconsequential and a
160. Governance Article, supra note 68, cl. 9, at 4-6.
161. Id.; see also Letter from News Corp. to Shareholders and Optionholders, supra note 82,
§ 6, at 3.
162. Cf. Letter from News Corporation to Shareholders and Optionholders, supra note 82, at
1.
163. Id. § 6, at 3.
164. See John Durie, Murdoch Peace Deal to Gain Support for US Move, AUSTL. FIN. REV.,
Oct. 6, 2004, at 1.
165. See Press Release, News Corp., supra note 57.
166. Votes cast in favor of the schemes of arrangement at the various class meetings of News
Corp. were as follows:
* Ordinary shareholders: 91.28 percent in favor; 8.72 percent against;
* Preferred shareholders: 96.23 percent in favor; 3.77 percent against;
* Option holders: 99.95 percent in favor; 0.05 percent against.
The schemes of arrangement were unanimously approved at the separate class meetings of the
Murdoch interests. Re News Corp. (2004) 51 A.C.S.R. 394, 1 3 (Austl.).
167. Governance Article, supra note 68, cl. 2, at 1; see also Maiden, supra note 77, at 1
(stating that the agreed changes were "at the top of a much more extensive list" sought by ACSI
and CGI).
168. See, e.g., Stephen Bartholomeusz, News Corp Capitulation a Victory for Shareholders,
AGE (Melbourne), Oct. 7, 2004, at 1 ("It is unlikely that News will completely satisfy the initial
demands of ACSI and CGI, but its backdown does represent a major victory for the shareholder
activists and a potentially significant milestone in the embryonic development of global
institutional co-operation on specific governance issues.").
169. Knight, supra note 58, at 25.
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mirage. 170 At least with respect to the poison pill, the latter view
appears to have been correct.
IV. NEWS CORP.'S POISON PILL-COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES
I think he's the most brilliant financial mind I know . . . . I should think we are all
responding to John Malone, dancing to his tune. I still do sometimes.
- Rupert Murdochlin
Rupert is a great guy but I never found him of compelling generosity.
- John Malonel72
[Murdoch is] a shark, always dangerous, always on the move. By contrast, Malone is a
swamp alligator, content to lie secreted in the mud, to let the prey come to him.
- David Elstein 7 3
On November 8, 2004, in the same week that the
reincorporation became fully effective, one problematic aspect of the
domicile change1 74 emerged as a reality: News Corp. issued a press
release announcing that its board of directors had adopted a poison
pill.175 The poison pill was in the form of a stockholder rights plan,
176
granting each shareholder a dividend distribution of one right for each
voting and non-voting common stock held.177 These inchoate rights
would crystallize and become exercisable if an acquirer obtained 15
percent or more of News Corp.'s voting common stock. 78 When
triggered, the rights would entitle their holder (with the exception of
170. See Wendy Frew, News Charter has Self-destruct Clause, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Oct. 19, 2004, at 22; Ben Power, News Rejects Murdoch Loophole Claim, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Oct.
19, 2004, at 15; see also Christian Catalano, News Finally Goes, and with a Big Tick, AGE
(Melbourne), Oct. 27, 2004, at 3 (claiming that even after revisions to the corporate governance
charter, investors were still concerned about takeover protection retained by Murdoch interests).
171. Neil Chenoweth, Malone's Ambitious Plan to Sneak up on Murdoch, AUSTL. FIN. REV.,
Oct. 18, 2005, at 1 (quoting Rupert Murdoch).
172. Christian Catalano, Murdoch Looks Set to Do a Deal with Malone, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Apr. 20, 2005, at 22 (quoting John Malone).
173. David Usborne, The Saturday Profile JOHN MALONE: The Man Who Shook up
Murdoch, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 13, 2004, at 44 (quoting David Elstein).
174. See Grant Samuel & Assocs., supra note 53, at E-11.
175. Press Release, News Corp., News Corporation Announces Stockholder Rights Plan 1
(Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.asx.com.aulasxpdfl20041108/pdf/3nlcbk2lxx2rz.pdf. The
decision was originally made by the board of directors as constituted prior to News Corp.'s
reincorporation. See Peers, supra note 78, at A2. On November 23, 2004, the reconstituted board
approved the earlier decision to implement a poison pill. News Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K),
at 2 (Nov. 24, 2004), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dl4D5a.166n6.htm0.
176. News Corp.'s stockholder rights plan is set out in News Corp., Report of a Foreign
Issuer (Form 6-K), at ex. B (Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsVsj.12Gu.htm.
177. Id. at 18.
178. Id. at ex. A.
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the acquirer) to purchase News Corp.'s voting and non-voting common
stock at half price, and, in the event of a merger or acquisition of News
Corp., buy shares in the acquiring company at half price. 179
The press release expressly referred to News Corp.'s recently
adopted board policy that any poison pill would expire after one year
unless approved by shareholders. However, references to this policy
were nebulous and suggested a certain malleability. According to the
press release:
[T]he Rights Plan currently provides that the rights will expire in one year. At or prior
to such one year anniversary, the Board of Directors will take such action as it deems
appropriate in the light of facts and circumstances existing at such time, including, if
appropriate, implementing such policy (whether by seeking stockholder ratification or
by allowing the rights to expire). 18 0
The press release also revealed that the poison pill was a direct
response to the actions of Liberty Media Corp. ("Liberty Media"),18
the investment vehicle of cable TV magnate John Malone, with whom
Murdoch had a longstanding involvement. 182 Five days before the pill's
adoption, Liberty Media disclosed that it had entered into a $1.48
billion equity swap1 83 for News Corp. shares with Merrill Lynch &
Company. 184 There were several prior controversial transactions in
Australia in which cash-settled equity swaps had been used
strategically in a takeover context,185 and there was growing
179. Press Release, News Corp., News Corp. Announces Stockholder Rights Plan, supra note
175, at 1; see also Armour & Skeel, supra note 5, at 1734 (describing the technical operation of
poison pills).
180. Press Release, News Corp., News Corp. Announces Stockholder Rights Plan, supra note
175, at 2.
181. Id. at 1. News Corp.'s press release noted that this action was taken by Liberty Media
"without any discussion with, or prior notice to, News Corporation." Id.
182. This involvement included Malone's participation in a News Corp. capital raising in the
early 1990s, which rescued New Corp. from near bankruptcy at the time. Martin Peers, Mogul
us. Mogul: Stock Gambit Strains Relations Between Two Media Titans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2005,
at Al. At one stage, Murdoch and Malone had also apparently contemplated appointing Malone
to the board of News Corp. Id.; Chenoweth, supra note 171, at 1.
183. For a description of a cash-settled equity swap, see Glencore Int'l AG v. Takeovers Panel
(2005) 220 A.L.R. 495, 498 (Austl.).
184. The equity swap for 84.7 million Class B News Corp. shares was scheduled for
completion by April 2005. Tim Burt, News Corp Channels Energies into Pay-TV, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 4, 2004, at 20; Liberty Media Buys Another Chunk of News Corp, DENVER BUS. J.,
Nov. 4, 2004, at 3, cited in Louise McCoach, The Glencore Decision: A Case for Reform? (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
185. Cash-settled equity swaps were used to obtain a pre-bid acquisition stake or a blocking
position in control transactions, such as the 2005 takeover by BHP Billiton of WMC Resources
Ltd. Bryan Frith, BHP King Hit Knocks Rivals out of the Ring, AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 9, 2005, at 36.
However, the most prominent example was the use of equity swaps by Glencore International
AG ("Glencore") to obtain a blocking position during a 2005 takeover bid by Centennial Coal Co.
Ltd. for Austral Coal Ltd. See generally Glencore Int'l AG, 220 A.L.R. at T$ 15-19; Emma
30
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international concern about the regulatory implications of equity
swaps. 86 In this instance, the equity swap transaction permitted
Liberty Media to raise its voting stake in News Corp. from
approximately 9 percent to 17 percent, only 13 percentage points
below the Murdoch family's voting interests. 87 Thus, whatever rule-
based constraints regarding takeovers Australian law may impose on
management via shareholder rights, it is clear that the market for
corporate control in the United States was a far more potent force
than in Australia, given the fact that News Corp. was a potential
takeover target virtually upon its arrival in Delaware.
Liberty Media's equity swap transaction was an opportunistic
one, taking advantage of instability in News Corp. shares during the
domicile change.s88 This instability was due to the fact that many
index funds in Australia and Asia were required to sell News Corp.
shares in anticipation of its removal from Australian stock indices. 89
Analysts considered that, but for the presence of a poison pill, Liberty
Media could have raised its voting stake to 49 percent of News Corp.
shares by swapping its 421.6 million non-voting Class A ordinary
shares'90 for Class B voting stock.19' In contrast, Mr. Murdoch was
Armson, The Australian Takeovers Panel and Judicial Review of its Decisions, 26 ADEL. L. REV.
327, 340-41 (2005). Glencore's equity swap provides a good illustration of the contemporary
phenomenon of hidden or "morphable" ownership, and the associated regulatory challenges of
such ownership. Henry T. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 839-40 (2006) (discussing the attempted use of
hidden ownership through equity swaps in the Glencore matter to avoid disclosure under
Australia's takeover rules).
186. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Loophole Lets a Foot in the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008,
at C1 (discussing a regulatory loophole in relation to equity swaps). For a summary of some
recent international regulatory proposals and developments in relation to equity derivatives,
including equity swaps, see COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., IMPROVING AUSTRALIA'S FRAMEWORK
FOR DISCLOSURE OF EQUITY DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS: ISSUES PAPER T 43 (2009).
187. Tim Burt, Liberty Share Deal Unsettles News Corp: Murdoch Issues Poison Pill as John
Malone's Media Group Lifts Stake, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 9, 2004, at 30; Martin Peers, News
Corp.'s Net Increases by 27% on TV Strength - Liberty Media Gains Right to Boost its Voting
Stake in Murdoch-led Concern, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2004, at B3.
188. Catalano, supra note 172. Speculation existed on Wall Street that the equity swap
constituted a negotiating strategy to put pressure on News Corp. to purchase certain Liberty
Media assets. Martin Peers, Malone Gets a Step on Murdoch, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2004, at C1.
189. Peers, supra note 182; The Lex Column, News Corp, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 9, 2004,
at 20; Jane Schulze, News Up as it Awaits Move on Index Shift, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 28, 2004, at 34.
190. Liberty Media owned approximately 17 percent of News Corp.'s non-voting shares. Sam
Matthews, Liberty Looks to Double Voting Stake in News Corporation, BRAND REPUBLIC, Nov. 5,
2004, http://www.brandrepublic.com/News/226985/Liberty-looks-double-voting-stake-News-
Corporation/?DCMP=ILC-SEARCH. This non-voting stake had been accumulated through deals
with News Corp. itself and was worth approximately $6 billion. Peers, supra note 182. By late
2003, Liberty Media was the largest shareholder in News Corp. on a global basis, including
voting and non-voting stock. Id.
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constrained in his ability to purchase any News Corp. shares that
came onto the market during this period because the concessions
extracted by the institutional investors prevented the Murdoch family
from acquiring more than an additional 3 percent of News Corp.'s
outstanding shares every six months. 192
News Corp.'s poison pill specifically exempted existing
shareholdings above the 15 percent threshold (such as the Murdoch
interests) and previously disclosed contracts to purchase stock (such
as Liberty Media's equity swap arrangement).1 93 Further acquisitions
of more than 1 percent by any party could, however, trigger the pill. 1 94
The pill therefore ensured that Liberty Media could not raise its
voting stake in News Corp. beyond 18 percent without experiencing
massive dilution. 195
Although Chancellor Chandler has suggested that Liberty
Media "suddenly appeared" as a hostile acquirer, 196 in fact it seems
that Liberty's acquisition strategy may have commenced some years
earlier. A 2005 Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT")
decision, Re Mangan v. The Treasury, revealed that Liberty Media had
lodged an application with the Australian Foreign Investment Review
Board ("FIRB") in 2002.197 The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers
Act of 1975 requires a foreign person seeking to acquire certain
interests in Australia, including via a takeover bid, to obtain prior
approval from FIRB. 198
The AAT decision concerned a Freedom of Information
request 99 which had been made by a Deutsche Bank analyst, Michael
191. Tim Burt, News Corp. Unveils Poison Pill Defence Strategy: Murdoch's Board Acts to
Ward off Any Liberty Media Bid after Malone Raises Voting Interest, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov.
9, 2004, at 21; Lex Column, supra note 189.
192. Peers, supra note 182; Letter from News Corp. to Shareholders and Optionholders,
supra note 82, app. ? (a).
193. Press Release, News Corp., News Corp. Announces Stockholder Rights Plan, supra note
175, at 1.
194. Id.
195. Peers, supra note 188.
196. UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2005).
197. No. N2005/150, [2005] A.A.T.A. 898, IT 1-10 (15 Sept., 2005) (Austl.).
198. The Federal Treasurer is the ultimate arbiter of foreign investment decisions, and is
advised by FIRB. For discussion of Australia's foreign investment regulatory regime, including
proposed 2009 amendments to extend its reach, see Greg Golding & Rachael Bassill, Australian
Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment by Sovereign Wealth Funds and State Owned
Enterprises: Are Our Rules Right?, paper presented at the Law Council Corporations Law
Committee, 2009 Corporate Law Workshop 10-12 (Sept. 12, 2009).
199. The application was made under the Freedom of Information Act, 1982, § 15(1) (Austl.).
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Mangan, 200 to the Australian Treasury for release of information about
whether Liberty Media had lodged a FIRB application to seek
clarification of any ownership restrictions on News Corp.201 Treasury
denied Mr. Mangan access to certain documents falling within the
scope of his Freedom of Information request on the basis that their
release would adversely affect Liberty Media's "lawful business,
commercial and financial affairs."202 Mr. Mangan subsequently
commenced proceedings before the AAT for review of this decision. In
the AAT proceedings, it became publicly known that Liberty Media
had indeed lodged a FIRB application in 2002. However, the AAT
upheld Treasury's decision and refused disclosure of specific
documents providing details of the FIRB application on a variety of
grounds, including that disclosure would reveal Liberty Media's
"strategy for maintaining and increasing its interest" in News Corp.
and would disadvantage Liberty Media vis-A-vis its competitors in any
acquisition of News Corp. shares. 203 The AAT also rejected the
applicant's argument that disclosure of the relevant documents was
now justified because News Corp.'s adoption of a poison pill had
effectively destroyed the documents' commercial value. 204
Liberty Media's 2002 FIRB application is significant because it
suggests the possibility that Liberty may have contemplated a full
takeover bid for News Corp. under Australian law at least two years
before its controversial equity swap transaction.205 Moreover, it
provides some support for the theory that the main motivation behind
News Corp.'s move to Delaware was to adopt a poison pill, which is not
200. Michael Mangan reappeared in the News Corp. tableau in 2005. See Michael Mangan,
Hardball, Murdoch Style, EUREKA REPORT, Oct. 14, 2005. A respected Australian media analyst,
who had covered News Corp. for fifteen years, Mangan claimed that he was retrenched by
Deutsche Bank after he downgraded News Corp. stock to a "sell" recommendation in early 2005.
Lisa Murray, Analyst Says News Threatened Brokers, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 15, 2005,
at 47. Mangan was openly skeptical about the effect of the Delaware reincorporation on News
Corp. shareholder value. Mangan, supra. Rupert Murdoch later publicly denied any attempt by
News Corp. to put pressure on Deutsche Bank because of Mangan's sell recommendation. See
Mark Coultan, Don't Blame Us, Says Murdoch - Share Price Will Rise, Eventually, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Oct. 24, 2005, at 19.
201. Re Mangan v. Treasury, [2005] A.A.T.A. 898, f 1, 3-4 (Austl.).
202. Id. 2, 7, 9. The relevant provisions on exemptions from disclosure are §§ 43 and 45,
Freedom of Information Act, 1982 (Austl.).
203. Re Mangan, [2005] A.A.T.A., at 29. From a policy perspective, the AAT also
considered that an order requiring disclosure would seriously limit the information that Liberty
Media would be willing to provide voluntarily to FIRB in any future applications. Id. 1 30, 44-
47.
204. Id. 32-33, 38-39.
205. Chenoweth, supra note 171, at 1.
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permitted under Australian law. 206 Unlike Delaware207 (and some
other jurisdictions such as Canada,208 France, and Japan209), Australia
and the United Kingdom have not proven to be hospitable terrain for
poison pills. Poison pills are, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent
in Australia, though there appears little consensus as to why this is
so. There is no general prohibition upon specific defensive measures of
this kind; however, at least three areas of Australian corporate law
and governance have tended to impede the development of poison
pills.
First, a possible explanation for the absence of poison pills in
Australia is that the general law on fiduciary duties prohibits
directors from implementing such measures.210 Directors are subject to
a fundamental duty to act in good faith for the benefit of the company
and for proper purposes. 211 Defeating a takeover or ensuring that the
current target board retains control are prima facie improper purposes
under Australian law.2 1 2 U.K. and Australian case law contain strong
dicta to the effect that it is unconstitutional for directors to allot
shares to manipulate control 213 and that shareholders have a personal
206. See Alan Kohler, Shock! News Screws Punters, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 13,
2005, at 45.
207. In the post-Enron era, however, shareholder pressure has led to the elimination of
poison pills in an increasing number of U.S. companies. In 2005, less than 50 percent of
companies in the S&P 500 had poison pills and this figure fell to 37 percent in 2006. INST.
S'HOLDER SERVS., POISON PILLS IN FRANCE, JAPAN, THE U.S. AND CANADA: TAKEOVER BARRIERS
RISE IN EUROPE AND JAPAN, BUT FALL IN NORTH AMERICA 10-11 (2007), available at
http://www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/PoisonPillPrimer.pdf.
208. Note, however, that in Canada the poison pill has evolved in an idiosyncratic way,
providing shareholders "with protections that were never intended by the original designers of
poison pills." Philip Anisman, Poison Pills: The Canadian Experience, in CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL
MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW: LIBER AMICORUM RICHARD M. BUXBAUM 12 (Theordor
Baums et al. eds., 2000).
209. Poison pills have only been introduced in Japan and France very recently. INST.
S'HOLDER SERVS, supra note 207, at 6-9.
210. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholders as Principals 32-33 (Duke Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 15, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=275049; Lynden Griggs, Golden Parachutes, Crown Jewels and the
Arrival of the White Knight-Strategies to Defeat a Takeover. What Use in an Era of Rigorous
Enforcement of Directors' Duties, 5 CANBERRA L. REV. 203, 214-16 (1998) (noting that directors
would have difficulty in proving such measures served a legitimate corporate purpose).
211. An analogous statutory duty is found in Corporations Act, 2001, § 181 (Austl.).
212. Hogg v. Cramphorn, Ltd., [1967] Ch. 254, 268 (U.K.); Howard Smith, Ltd. v. Ampol
Petroleum, Ltd., [1974] A.C. 821, 837 (P.C.) (appeal taken from New South Wales) (U.K.).
Directors' conduct may, however, in limited circumstances be characterized as within the proper
sphere of managerial discretion, even though the conduct incidentally thwarts a takeover bid.
See, e.g., Harlowe's Nominees Pty. Ltd. v. Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co. NL (1968) 121
C.L.R. 483, 493-94 (Austl.); cf. Teck Corp. Ltd. v. Millar (1972) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288, T 157-65
(Can.).
213. Hogg, [1967] Ch. 254 at 268; Howard Smith, Ltd., [1974] A.C. 821 at 837.
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right to be protected against dilution of their voting rights by
improper board conduct.214 Any such share issuance by the directors
would be voidable, unless ratified by the shareholders in a general
meeting. 215 Since poison pills, if triggered, produce substantial dilution
of the bidder's stake216  and often discriminate between
shareholders, 2 17 in most cases it would be difficult for directors to
argue that they have fulfilled their duty to act for a proper purpose in
the best interests of the company. 218 A statutory remedy is also
available for conduct that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or
discriminatory to a shareholder under Australian law.2 19
The second inhibiting factor is the approach of the Australian
Takeovers Panel toward defensive conduct by target boards. The
"frustrating action" policy would seem to preclude the adoption of a
poison pill without shareholder consent,220 and the Panel has made
some specific remarks about poison pills that are consistent with this
interpretation. 221 Further support for this position can be derived from
the important decision of the Panel concerning a 2003 takeover bid by
Centro for the AMP Shopping Centre Trust. 222 This decision, in the
214. See, e.g., Residues Treatment & Trading Co. v. S. Res. Ltd. (1988) 51 S.A.S.R. 177, 202
(Austl.) (King, C.J.).
215. Hogg, [1967] Ch. 254 at 268-69.
216. Depending on whether the poison pill has a "flip-in" or a "flip-over" feature, the dilution
may relate to the equity of either the target company or the hostile bidder. Ogowewo, supra note
130, at 589 n.2.
217. Such discrimination will occur where the bidder is excluded from the invitation to target
shareholders to buy two shares for the price of one under the shareholder rights plan. Armour &
Skeel, supra note 5, at 1734.
218. Griggs, supra note 210, at 215-216; see also Criterion Props. Plc v. Stratford UK
Properties L.L.C., [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2108, 26 (U.K.) (positing that only when structured to drive
off one particular predator could a poison pill ever possibly be justified as a proper purpose). But
see John Plender, An Acceptable Poison Pill? It's Not an Oxymoron, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 10,
2006, at 20 (discussing one form of poison pill, as adopted by the Japanese company, Nippon
Steel Corporation, which might be beneficial for long-term shareholders).
219. Corporations Act, 2001, § 2 32(e) (Austl.).
220. This policy was developed in Re Pinnacle VRB Ltd. (No. 5) (2001) 39 A.C.S.R. 43, Tf 21-
31 (Austl.); Re Pinnacle VRB Ltd. (No. 8) (2001) 39 A.C.S.R. 55, app. 3 (Austl.); Re
Bigshop.com.au Ltd. (No. 2) (Oct. 17, 2001) [2001] A.T.P. 24, $ 32-36 (Austl.). See generally
Emma Armson, The Frustrating Action Policy: Shifting Power in the Takeover Context, 21 COMP.
& SEC. L.J. 487 (2003).
221. The Australian Takeovers Panel has stated, for example, that "[aigreements which the
Panel considers are 'poison pills' and have not been approved by relevant shareholders may be
found to create unacceptable circumstances." Takeovers Panel, Guidance, supra note 143,
12.28, n.11. Although Guidance Note 12 stated that the Panel may issue a further guidance note
specifically on poison pills in the future if it appeared necessary, id. 12.35, this has not
occurred to date.
222. See Re AMP Shopping Centre Trust (No. 1) (2003) 45 A.C.S.R. 496, [2003] A.T.P. 21,
59-69 (Austl.), and Re AMP Shopping Centre Trust (No. 2) (2003) 45 A.C.S.R. 524, [2003] ATP
24, TT 14-21 (Austl.), which concerned a managed investment scheme. The Australian
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context of managed schemes, demonstrated that the Panel is "willing
to scrutinize measures that tend to act as poison pills . . . to ensure
that unitholders are not unfairly deprived of the opportunity for a
takeover premium." 22 3 The Panel stressed the "principle of 'non-
entrenchment' " as a basis for its finding of unacceptable
circumstances.224 This reasoning also appears to underpin the English
Court of Appeal decision in the leading U.K. case on poison pills,
Criterion Properties Plc v. Stratford UK Properties LLC. 2 2 5
The third, and most significant, factor that has prevented the
use of poison pills in Australia is the ASX Listing Rules. 226 Some
commentators have argued that former ASX Listing Rule 3G(7), 227
which specifically prohibited certain defensive measures, would have
invalidated the use of poison pills.228 Although this particular rule is
no longer operative, the more general wording of Listing Rule 6.1,
which affords the ASX discretion to ensure that the terms governing
each class of equity securities are "appropriate and equitable," could
still be applied to invalidate poison pills.229
Moreover, even if poison pills are not expressly prohibited
under the ASX Listing Rules, the rules require shareholder approval
Takeovers Panel held, at first instance, that the granting of certain pre-emptive rights to acquire
interests in AMP Shopping Centre Trust (ART), exercisable on a change of responsible entity in
ART, constituted "unacceptable circumstances." Unacceptable circumstances existed because: (a)
the pre-emptive rights would potentially deter a takeover bid for the target and entrench ART's
existing responsible entity, which was contrary to the principles of an efficient, competitive, and
informed market; (b) there had had not been adequate disclosure to unitholders about the effect
of the pre-emptive rights; and (c) the pre-emptive rights had not been approved by unitholders.
The Review Panel upheld the first instance decision. See generally Allens Arthur Robinson, In
the Deal (Aug. 7, 2003), http://www.aar.com.aulpubs/itdlaug03/index.htm (outlining the details of
the case and its implications).
223. Braddon Jolley et al., Takeovers Panel Doesn't Swallow Poison Pill (July 2003),
http://www.findlaw.com.aularticle/9240.htm.
224. Re AMP Shopping Centre Trust (No. 1) (2003) 45 A.C.S.R. at TI 66-68.
225. [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2108, 1 23-27 (U.K.). An appeal to the House of Lords was decided on
different grounds. [2004] U.K.H.L. 28, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1846, 29-33. It has been noted that,
although Lord Justice Carnwath referred to the defensive arrangement in this case as a "poison
pill", it in fact more closely resembled a lock-up agreement. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 5, at
1784 n.269.
226. See RODD LEVY, TAKEOVERS: LAW AND STRATEGY 151-52 (2d ed. 2002).
227. ASX Listing Rule 3G(7) prohibited a company from
issuing an option which, in the opinion of the stock exchange, was designed to
frustrate a takeover bid or frustrate a person from becoming entitled to more
than 20 per cent of equity securities in the company, or a person already
entitled to more than 20 per cent of equity securities acquiring further equity
securities in the company.
Id.




for a range of transactions related to changes of control or alterations
to the capital structure of a listed company. 230 Some of these rules
would affect the adoption of a poison pill. Listing Rule 7.1 has
particular resonance in this regard.
Listing Rule 7.1 requires shareholder approval for any
issuance, other than on a pro-rata basis, of more than 15 percent of
the company's share capital.231 The rule originated out of concern
about defensive share placements that might frustrate takeover bids
and dilute the interests of existing shareholders.232 In 2003, only six
months before News Corp. announced its Delaware reincorporation
plan, the ASX considered reform proposals to Listing Rule 7.1 aimed
at providing more discretion to directors in issuing securities. The
ASX acknowledged that Listing Rule 7.1 was more restrictive and
interventionist than the rules and practices of comparable exchanges,
and the reform proposals sought to align it better with international
markets. 233 Specific reform proposals included raising the 15 percent
threshold for shareholder consent to 20 percent 234 and allowing
shareholders to confer a general mandate on management to issue
securities. 235 Ultimately, however, no changes were made to Listing
Rule 7.1, and the 15 percent threshold for shareholder consent to a
securities issue remains. The triggering of a poison pill arguably falls
within the ambit of Listing Rule 7.1 and would therefore require
shareholder approval.
The ASX Listing Rules, therefore, undermine management's
ability to establish entrenching mechanisms, such as poison pills,
without shareholder consent. Recent empirical research suggesting
that the presence of entrenching mechanisms may reduce firm value
230. These ASX Listing Rules include: Rule 10.1 (acquisition or disposal of a substantial
asset to a person in a position of influence); Rule 11.2 (change in the main undertaking of the
company); Rule 7.1 (issue of more than 15 percent of capital currently on issue); Rule 7.6 (issue of
shares if 50 percent of shareholders call a meeting to appoint or remove directors); and Rule 7.9
(issue of shares within three months of written notice of a takeover proposal). See ASX Listing
Rules, supra note 89. See generally Takeovers Panel, Guidance, supra note 143, T 12.8-12.9.
231. For a discussion of the history of Listing Rule 7.1 and a comparison of its operation with
capital raising barriers in other jurisdictions, see Austl. Stock Exch. Ltd., Exposure Draft,
Capital Raising Mechanisms in a Disclosure-Based Market - ASX Proposals for Informed Choice:
A Review of Listing Rule 7.1 - Proposed ASX Listing Rule Amendments T. 6.1-6.4, 8.1-8.3 (Oct.
2003).
232. Id. 7.1-7.3.
233. Id. f 4.1-4.3, 8.3.
2 34. Id. 'r 9. 1.
235. It was proposed that such a general mandate would permit management to issue
securities without the need for specific shareholder consent for a thirteen month period from the
date of the mandate. Id. 9.2.
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and stockholder returns supports the approach taken by the listing
rules from a policy perspective. 236
The anti-entrenchment effect of the ASX Listing Rules seems
to present a profound dilemma in relation to the News Corp.
reincorporation story. In its concessions to the institutional investors,
News Corp. agreed to retain full foreign listing on the ASX, thereby
binding itself to compliance with these listing rules. As such, the ASX
Listing Rules should still have prohibited News Corp. from issuing a
poison pill even after its reincorporation in Delaware.
The answer to this puzzle appears to lie in the ability of the
ASX to waive compliance with its listing rules. In the week that the
Delaware reincorporation became fully effective, the ASX granted an
array of waivers to News Corp. exempting the company from
compliance with particular listing rules. 23 7 Indeed, many of these
waivers were granted on November 4, 2004,238 only one day after
Justice Hely had issued orders in the Federal Court of Australia
approving the News Corp. schemes of arrangement.239 W1hile some of
these waivers involved technical aspects of the reincorporation, others
related to fundamental corporate governance matters. A number of
the waivers, in fact, related to specific listing rules that the
institutional investors had included in their Governance Article and
had sought to incorporate into News Corp.'s Delaware charter. 240 The
236. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 786-88 (2009).
237. On November 2, 2004, the ASX issued a waiver exempting News Corp. from compliance
with ASX Listing Rule 6.23. News Corp., ASX Waiver: Listing Rule 6.23, WLC040530-001 (Nov.
2, 2004). On November 4, 2004, further waivers were issued in favor of News Corp. in relation to
the following ASX Listing Rules: LR 1.1 (condition 3) (WLC040532-001); LR 1.1 (condition 8)
(WLC040532-002); LR 6.8 (WLC040532-003); LR 6.9 (WLC040532-004); LR 6.22 (WLC040532-
005); LR 6.23 (WLC040532-006); LR 7.1 (WLC040532-007); LR 8.10 (WLC040532-008); LR 10.11
(WLC040532-009); LR 14.3 (WLC040532-010); LR 14.4 (WLC040532-011); and LR 15.15
(WLC040532-012). In 2005, further waivers were granted to News Corp. regarding LR 3.8A
(WLC050287-001) and LR 7.33 (WLC050287-002), and in 2007, a waiver was granted of LR 2.4
(WLC070221-001).
238. ASX Listing Rules LR 1.1 (condition 3); LR 1.1 (condition 8); LR 6.8; LR 6.9; LR 6.22;
LR 6.23; LR 7.1; LR 8.10; LR 10.11; LR 14.3; LR 14.4 and LR 15.15.
239. Re News Corp. (2004) 51 A.S.C.R. 394, 1 9 (Austl.). In making these orders, Justice Hely
specifically noted the corporate governance concessions adopted by News Corp. at the request of
the institutional investors. Justice Hely conceded that, although the concessions did not alter the
actual terms of the schemes of arrangement he was asked to approve, they were relevant to "the
overall commercial context" of the corporate reconstruction. Id. 5.
240. ASX waivers were granted to News Corp. with respect to the following listing rules,
which had been included in the institutional investors' Governance Article: Listing Rule 7.1
(requiring shareholder approval for new share issues exceeding 15 percent of capital); Listing
Rule 10.11 (requiring shareholder approval for issue of securities to a related party); Listing Rule
14.3 (requirements regarding nomination of directors); and Listing Rule 14.4 (requirements
38
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underlying policy of these listing rules is shareholder protection. 241 It
is particularly significant that one of the waivers related to ASX
Listing Rule 7.1, the rule that primarily stands in the path of
Australian companies issuing a poison pill.
In granting waivers to News Corp. at the time of the
reincorporation, the ASX faced an inevitable position of conflict. Since
its demutualization and listing as a public company,242 the ASX had
been subject to criticism on the basis that a conflict of interest existed
between its twin goals of regulation and profit maximization. 24 3 This
conflict lay particularly close to the surface in its relations with News
Corp. Earlier in 2004, there had been consternation in the Australian
marketplace that News Corp. might delist from the ASX.24 4 News
Corp.'s decision to retain full secondary listing ensured that the ASX
continued to receive revenue from trading of News Corp. shares in
Australia.
A further entrenchment mechanism, which is closely allied to
poison pills and also makes an appearance in the News Corp.
reincorporation story, is the staggered board. In the United States, the
combination of a poison pill and a staggered board will constitute a
virtually impregnable takeover defense. 245 Under Delaware law,
regarding election and rotation of directors). See Governance Article, supra note 68, cl. 7 ("ASX
Listing Rules provisions to apply"); ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89.
241. The waivers granted by the ASX specify the "underlying policy" for each listing rule
waived. According to ASX Listing Waiver for LR 7.1 (WLC040532-007), the underlying policy of
LR 7.1 is to "provide greater protection to smaller holders against dilution . . . ." ASX Listing
Waiver for LR 10.11 (WLC040532-009) states that, by requiring shareholder approval for an
issue of securities to a related party, LR 10.11 is "directed at preventing related party obtaining
securities on advantageous terms and increasing their holding proportionate to other holdings . .
. ." ASX Listing Waiver for LR 14.3 (WLC040532-010) states that LR 14.3, which provides that
an entity must accept nominations for the election of directors up to 35 business days before the
date of meeting, "gives reasonable opportunity for candidates to be nominated" and "supports
shareholder democracy." According to ASX Listing Waiver for LR 14.4 (WLC040532-011), LR
14.4, regarding election and rotation of directors, "prevents entrenchment of directors" and
"supports shareholder democracy" (waivers on file with the author).
242. The ASX was one of the first stock exchanges in the world to demutualize and to list as
a public company on its own market. Fleur Leyden, Best Result for ASX is Humphry's Last, AGE
(Melbourne), July 29, 2004, at 1; Gwen Robinson, Australia - Another Milestone Nears, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 24, 1998, at 7.
243. See, e.g., Editorial, The Best Way to Restore Faith, AUSTL. FIN. REV., July 23, 2002, at
62.
244. See, e.g., Stephen Bartholomeusz, News Move to NY Not Good for ASX, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Apr. 27, 2004, at 18.
245. Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 919
(2002).
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directors may be elected for a staggered term of up to three yearS24 6
and, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, these
directors can only be removed "for cause."2 4 7 This insulates directors
from removal and effectively prevents an acquirer from obtaining
control of the board in a single election. While it is common for
Australian and U.K. public companies to have staggered election
terms for directors, staggered boards cannot operate as an
entrenchment and anti-takeover device in these jurisdictions. This is
because shareholders possess an absolute right to remove directors
with or without cause under Australian and U.K. law. 24 8 At the time of
News Corp.'s reincorporation, the institutional investors were
unsuccessful in their attempt to include an analogous right in the
Delaware charter.249 Instead, the charter provided for a staggered
board,250 the directors of which would, according to the Delaware
norm, be removable only for cause.251
246. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2008). Note, however, that the proposed Shareholder
Bill of Rights currently under consideration (discussed supra notes 24, 38) would introduce a
requirement that directors be subject to annual election by the shareholders. See Shareholder
Bill of Rights of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 5(e)(3), available at
http://Iaw.du.eduldocuments/corporate-governancellegislation/bill-text-shareholders-bill-of-
rights-act-of-2009.pdf ("Corporate Governance Standards ... Annual Elections Required").
247. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (2008). This contrasts with the modern default rule,
applying to non-classified boards, that directors may be removed with or without cause. Removal
of directors "for cause" is no easy matter, and has been described as a "weapon of last resort."
CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 163 (5th ed., 2006). See also Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134
A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957), the leading case on removal for cause.
248. This right cannot be altered in the constitution or by agreement. See Corporations Act,
2001 § 203D (Austl.); Companies Act, 2006 c. 46 § 168(1) (U.K.).
249. Governance Article, supra note 68, at 2.
250. See News Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of News Corporation, Inc., at ex. 3.1, art. V (Nov. 12, 2004). This was in spite of the
fact that there has been a trend recently towards declassification of U.S. boards. For example, "in
2006, for the first time ever, a majority of S&P 500 companies had annually elected boards."
INST. S'HOLDER SERVS., supra note 207, at 11.
251. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (2008). Note, however, that News Corp.'s charter
discards this norm in limited circumstances, stating that "[alt any time that there shall be three
or fewer stockholders of record, directors may be removed with or without cause." News Corp.,
Current Report (Form 8-K), ex. 3.1, art. V, at 14.
[Vol. 63:1:140
2010] SUBVERTING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 41
V. EXTENSION OF THE PILL AND ITS AFTERMATH
It was never a bylaw. It was never a promise. It was never a pledge.
- Rupert Murdoch252




If News Corp.'s adoption of a poison pill in 2004 aroused
institutional investor concern, its actions the following year produced
a furor. In August 2005, News Corp. announced that its board had
decided to extend the poison pill for two years beyond its original one-
year expiration date in November 2005 without shareholder
approval. 254 The announcement made no reference either to the board
policy on poison pills or to the reasons for deviating from that policy.
The general reaction of the Australian financial press was severe, with
one critic describing the announcement as "quite breathtaking" and
evidence that News Corp. was "mostly run by untrustworthy
people."255
In a response to this criticism, John Hartigan, CEO and
chairman of News Corp.'s wholly-owned Australian subsidiary, News
Ltd., 25 6 justified the board's decision as necessary on the basis that
changes of control are less stringently regulated under U.S. law than
under Australian law. According to Hartigan, the board's gatekeeper
role under U.S. law operates as the functional equivalent of
Australian law's 20 percent threshold rule in ensuring that all
shareholders are treated fairly and equitably.257 Without the reversal
of the board's policy on poison pills, Hartigan said, all News Corp.
shareholders "would now be potentially at risk of a predator who could
assume control without paying a premium for it."258
252. Lisa Murray, Poison Pill - There Was No Promise, Says Murdoch, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Oct. 13, 2005, at 21 (quoting Rupert Murdoch).
253. UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. Civ.A. 1699-N, 2006 WL 207505 at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan.
20, 2006).
254. News Corporation, Current Report (Form 8-K), ex. 99.1, at 7 (Aug. 10, 2005); Keith L.
Johnson & Andrew Clearfield, Improving Governance by Joint Shareholder Action; Investors
Await Trial to Assert Rights on News Corp. Poison Pill, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 6, 2006,
at 12.
255. Kohler, supra note 206.
256. Press Release, News Corp., John Hartigan Appointed Chairman of News Ltd. (Aug. 19,
2005).
257. John Hartigan, News Ltd. Boss Fires Back over Poison Pill, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Aug. 20, 2005, at 46.
258. Id.
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Rupert Murdoch claimed simply that News Corp. had never
actually promised to make the board policy unalterable. 259 News
Corp.'s undertaking concerning the extension of poison pills had
appeared, however, not only in its board policy, but also as an
attachment to the Australian Federal Court proceedings, 260 which had
approved the corporate restructuring and reincorporation. 261 In
August 2005, the Australian corporate regulator, ASIC, announced
that it intended to investigate News Corp.'s statements to the
market,262 but this inquiry was later discontinued on the basis that
News Corp. was now a U.S. company.263
In October 2005, a group of twelve predominantly Australian
and European institutional investors filed legal proceedings against
News Corp. and its directors in the Delaware Chancery Court in
UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp.264 The plaintiffs sought to invalidate
News Corp.'s extension of the poison pill and any subsequent
extensions unless authorized by shareholder vote. 2 65 Their claim was
based on a variety of grounds, including breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary
duty.2 6 6 The defendants, on the other hand, argued that reversal of its
earlier board policy did not breach a binding contractual undertaking
259. Murray, supra note 252.
260. Kate Askew & Lisa Murray, A Hard Act to Swallow, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug.
20, 2005, at 43.
261. In the Federal Court proceedings confirming the schemes of arrangement, Justice Hely
made specific reference to the fact that News Corp. had agreed to additional corporate
governance provisions. Re News Corp. (2004) 51 A.C.S.R. 394, T 5 (Austl.).
262. See Askew & Murray, supra note 260.
263. In announcing the decision to discontinue the inquiry, ASIC's head of compliance stated
[o]bviously, it's a concern when a company makes a statement to
shareholders, only to go back on it, so we had a good look at it . . . . But the
statement was made by a US company under US law and it would require a
very resource-intensive exercise for us to pursue the matter. We have decided
we should stay out of it.
Murray, supra note 252.
264. The majority of institutional shareholders were from Australia (six of the plaintiffs
being members of ACSI), the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Only two of the plaintiffs
were U.S. institutional investors. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL
3529317, at *3 (Del Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (The plaintiffs to the action were UniSuper Ltd, Public
Sector Superannuation Scheme Board, Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme Board, United
Super Pty Ltd, Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd, HEST
Australia Ltd, CARE Super Pty Ltd, Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd, Britel Fund
Nominees Limited, Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds, and the Clinton Township Police and Fire Retirement System.); Stephen Bartholomeusz,
Murdoch and the Global Fund Alliance that Bites, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 11, 2005, at
19; Johnson & Clearfield, supra note 254.
265. UniSuper Ltd., 2005 WL 3529317, at *1.
266. Id. at *3.
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by News Corp. 2 6 7 Moreover, they argued that any such contract
between shareholders and the board would, contrary to Delaware law,
constitute an impermissible constraint on centralized managerial
authority under § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 26 8
In response to a motion filed by the defendants to dismiss the
case, Chancellor Chandler ruled in late 2005 that the plaintiffs' action
for breach of contract and estoppel 269 could proceed.270 The plaintiffs
claimed that an agreement existed, either in the form of an oral
contract or a written contract, in which News Corp. had consented to
subject any extension of the poison pill to a shareholder vote. 271
Although Chancellor Chandler considered that the complaint asserted
few facts to support either form of contract, the plaintiffs' entitlement
to the benefit of all reasonable inferences was sufficient to overcome
the motion to dismiss.272
Chancellor Chandler raised some problematic aspects of the
plaintiffs' claim. He observed, in reasoning reminiscent of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,273 that the
plaintiffs were sophisticated institutional investors who could have
protected their interests by negotiating an enforceable agreement or
changes to the corporate charter, as had indeed occurred in the case of
some other concessions. 274 He also noted that interpretational
difficulties could arise in the future about ambiguities in the alleged
agreement. 275
In spite of these difficulties, the plaintiffs' claim withstood the
defendants' motion to dismiss. Chancellor Chandler rejected the
defendants' argument that any agreement between the board and
shareholders would be contrary to the general grant of managerial
power under Delaware law. 2 7 6 Adopting a principal/agent theory of the
267. News Corp. claimed that it had promised to establish a board policy, but had not
promised that the policy would be immutable. Id. at *3 n.34.
268. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008); UniSuper Ltd., 2005 WL 3529317, at *6; see also
Peg Brickley, News Corp. Wins Right to Appeal Holder Suit in Delaware, Dow JONES
NEWSWIRES, Jan. 20, 2006.
269. The defendants' motion to dismiss was successful in relation to the counts of fraud,
negligent misrepresentation and equitable fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. See UniSuper
Ltd., 2005 WL 3529317 at *10.
270. Id.
271. It was argued that the parties entered into a written contract evidenced by News Corp.'s
Press Release and Letter to Shareholders at the time of its reincorporation. Id. at *4.
272. Id.
273. 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
274. UniSuper Ltd., 2005 WL 3529317 at *4 n.39.
275. Id. at *5.
276. Id. at *6.
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relationship between shareholders and the board,277 he viewed
shareholders as "the ultimate holders of power," or "owners" of the
company, 278 and saw no impediment to directors entering into such a
contract with the shareholders. 279 Although Chancellor Chandler's
theory of the shareholder does not accord with modern U.K. and
Australian law, 2 80 the outcome in the case is consistent with legal
principles concerning allocation of power in these jurisdictions.2 81
However, it should be remembered that the UniSuper case is a
decision of the Delaware Chancery Court,282 and it is open to doubt
whether the Delaware Supreme Court would agree with it.283
Policy issues were clearly influential in the UniSuper case. 28 4
Chancellor Chandler noted that a "troubling" aspect of the defendants'
view of Delaware law was that, if correct, it would potentially
invalidate all of the governance concessions made by News Corp. in
favor of the institutional investors, not merely the board policy on
poison pills.285 Yet the judge accepted that without these concessions,
News Corp.'s reincorporation would not have occurred. 286 Echoing
certain policy concerns of the Paulson Committee, 287 Chancellor
Chandler suggested that shareholders of foreign companies would in
the future be unlikely to vote for reincorporation in Delaware if
277. Id. at *6, *8.
278. Id. at *6.
279. Id.
280. Although nineteenth-century U.K. corporate law adopted an agency analysis, see, e.g.,
Isle of Wight Ry. Co v. Tahourdin, (1884) 25 Ch.D. 320, 320-21 (C.A.), this analysis was
definitively rejected in Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, (1906) 2
Ch. 34, 45-46 (C.A.). See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48
AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 42-44, 48 (2000).
281. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 280, at 43-44.
282. News Corp. asked the Court of Chancery to certify the case for immediate appeal, and,
although the Court of Chancery did so, see UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. Civ.A 1699-N, 2006
WL 207505, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2006), the Delaware Supreme Court declined to accept an
appeal in the case, News Corp. v. UniSuper Ltd., 906 A.2d 138, 139 (Del. 2006) (depublished).
283. Indeed, this point was made by a Delaware Supreme Court judge in a hearing. Vice
Chancellor Lamb said, "UniSuper is a decision by the Court of Chancery. It's not a Supreme
Court decision, and it isn't necessarily true that the Supreme Court would agree, is it?":
Transcript of Final Hearing at 36, Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737 (Del. Ch. 2006) (C.A. No.
2145-N), available at http://www.law.harvard.edulfaculty/bebchuk/Policy/CAHearing
Transcript.pdf, quoted in Guhan Subramanian, The Emerging Problem of Embedded Defenses:
Lessons from Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1243 n.35 (2007).
284. UniSuper Ltd., 2006 WL 207505, at *1.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 37, at 16.
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inducements to procure their vote were held to be unenforceable
there.288
On April 6, 2006, less than three weeks before the case was due
to go to trial, the parties settled the proceedings, and News Corp.
agreed to allow shareholders to vote on the extension of the poison pill
at its October 2006 annual meeting.289 On October 20, 2006, News
Corp. shareholders voted to approve the continuance of the poison pill
defense.290 The approval margin was relatively slim-57 percent to 43
percent.291 Shareholder backlash was also evident in voting on the
reelection of four directors. 292 The conflict was finally resolved when
Rupert Murdoch and John Malone settled their differences via an $11
billion asset swap, with News Corp. agreeing to lift its contentious
pill.293
Although the UniSuper case was ultimately settled, its
implications for the balance of managerial and shareholder power in
the United States continue to be tested. In June 2006, Bebchuk v. CA,
Inc. 2 94 came before the Delaware Court of Chancery. Bebchuk, like
UniSuper, concerned poison pills. It involved the validity of a proposed
stockholder bylaw which sought to restrict the authority of the board
of directors to enact any stockholder rights plan in the absence of
288. UniSuper Ltd., 2006 WL 207505, at *1.
289. The trial had been scheduled for April 24, 2006. Julia Angwin, News Corp. to Put Poison
Pill to Shareholder Vote, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2006, at A3; Joshua Chaffin, News Corp Settles
Poison Pill Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 2006, at 25; John Plender, supra note 218.
290. Julia Angwin, News Corp. Fends off Liberty Media, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2006, at A3.
291. Liberty Media voted against renewal of the poison pill. Id.
292. CGI and ISS recommended that shareholders withhold their votes from the four
directors seeking reelection. Sundeep Tucker, News Corp Tries to Halt Poison Pill Revolt, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 11, 2005, at 23. When the reelection vote took place, 15 percent of shares
voted withheld support from three directors seeking reelection and 13 percent of shares voted
withheld support for News Corp.'s President, Peter Chernin. Julia Angwin, News Corp.'s
Murdoch Claims Victory in Poison-Pill Decision, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2005, at A3; see also
Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson & Aline Van Duyn, Murdoch Weathers Investor Protests, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 22, 2005, at 1.
293. Under the deal with News Corp., Liberty Media agreed to swap its $11.2 billion stake in
News Corp. for News Corp.'s 38.5 percent stake in DirecTV, $588 million in cash (raised from
$550 million under an initial agreement in December 2006) and three local Fox sports channels,
valued at approximately $550 million. The deal was generally considered to favor Liberty Media.
The elimination of Liberty Media's News Corp. stake increased the voting stake of other News
Corp. shareholders, including Murdoch family interests, which rose from approximately 31.2
percent to 38 percent after the deal. The asset swap was later overwhelmingly approved by News
Corp. Class B shareholders. See Julia Angwin & Matthew Karnitschnig, Liberty is Expected to
Seek Partner for DirecTV - With News Corp. Deal Set, Investors Look for Tie- Up; Murdoch to
Drop Poison Pill, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2006, at A3; News Corp. Shareholders Accept Liberty
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at 6.
294. 902 A.2d 737 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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shareholder consent.295 The corporation argued that the proposed
bylaw could be omitted from its proxy materials on the basis that its
adoption would violate Delaware law by seeking to limit the authority
of the board of directors and interfere with managerial power.296
Vice Chancellor Lamb dismissed the request for declaratory
relief as "unripe"297 and noted that the court should be particularly
cautious in giving advisory or hypothetical opinions in matters that
raise novel and significant issues under Delaware law.298 Nonetheless,
in obiter dictum the court stated that the proposed bylaw was not
"obviously invalid."299 The court, while acknowledging that the power
to adopt a rights plan is clearly vested in the board of directors,
observed that it was "less clear that the exercise of that power can
never be the subject of a bylaw, whether enacted by the board of
directors or by the stockholders."300 The court relied on the UniSuper
decision in support of the proposition that a contractual restraint on
the board's power to issue a poison pill is valid under Delaware law. 30 1
Therefore, although the conflict between News Corp. and its
institutional shareholders was settled, the ruling in UniSuper Ltd. v.
News Corp.302-that, under Delaware law, shareholders may enter
into enforceable agreements with the board concerning the allocation
of power under corporate governance structureS303-Continues to exert
influence. Given the Delaware courts' traditional legitimization of
poison pills without the need for shareholder consent, 304 the UniSuper
295. Under the proposed amendment to the company's bylaws, in the absence of shareholder
consent, any adoption or extension of a stockholder rights plan by the board of directors would
require unanimous consent of directors and would automatically expire one year after its
adoption or amendment. Id. at 738-39.
296. Id. The SEC refused to give a "no-action letter" in connection with CA's proposed
omission of the shareholder proposal, since litigation was pending. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2006 WL 1547985, at *1 (June 5, 2006).
297. According to the court, the action would only become ripe and within its jurisdiction if
the bylaw were put to a stockholder vote and adopted. Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 741.
298. Id. at 740 (citing Stroud v Milliken Enter., 552 A.2d 476, 480-81 (Del. 1989)).
299. Id. at 742.
300. Id. at 743 (citing Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985); UniSuper
Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
301. Id. at 743 n.34. The court also considered that future factual matters, such as the
possibility that the CA board might voluntarily restrict its powers in relation to poison pills as in
the UniSuper case, could also affect the justiciable issues in the case. Id. at 743.
302. 2005 WL 3529317.
303. See id. at *5-6; Johnson & Clearfield, supra note 254.
304. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1984) (approving the
use of "Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plans"). While basic poison pills, such as that found in
the Moran case, have been upheld by the Delaware courts, the courts have invalidated some
variations, such as "dead hand" and "no hand" poison pills. See, e.g., Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723
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case has been described as marking "a symbolic shift"305 in this regard.
It was suggested that the possible weakening of poison pills through
the UniSuper and Bebchuk decisions might lead to the development of
alternative forms of takeover defenses in the United States.306
However, a more recent decision of the Delaware Supreme
Court, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,307 has
significantly curtailed the potential use of stockholder-proposed
bylaws to restrict the board's power to adopt poison pills. While
providing some scope for shareholder bylaws restricting the power of
the board,308 the decision nonetheless strongly reaffirms as a "cardinal
precept" the board's freedom to control the management and affairs of
the corporation. 309 The court declared that "a proper function of
bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific
substantive business decisions." 310 The court further rejected the
argument that shareholders and the board possess coextensive powers
to adopt and amend the bylaws. 311 This aspect of the decision stands
in clear contrast to the Australian and U.K. default rules on
constitutional allocation of power.
One final intriguing aspect of the News Corp. reincorporation
involves its effect on the corporation's equity value. In promoting its
move to Delaware, News Corp. asserted that the reincorporation
would enhance its share price through increased trading by indexed
investors, such as mutual funds, that invest in the S&P 500.312 This
prediction accords with some early studies, which found that
A.2d 1180, 1182 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("dead hand" poison pills); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1283 (Del. 1998) ("no hand" poison pills).
305. Plender, supra note 218; see also Stuart M. Grant & Megan D. McIntyre, UniSuper v
News Corporation Affirmation that Shareholders, Not Directors, are the Ultimate Holders of
Corporate Power, 1557 PLI/CORP. 17, 19 (2006) (viewing the decision as a significant "victory for
shareholder rights").
306. See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 283, at 1243-44.
307. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). The case concerned a proposed bylaw, which would have
directed CA's board of directors to cause the corporation in certain circumstances to reimburse
stockholders for reasonable proxy expenses, relating to nomination of directors in a contested
election. Id. at 230.
308. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the proper scope for bylaws was limited to
defining the process and procedures by which managerial decisions are made and considered
that bylaws of this ilk would not constitute an illegitimate intrusion into the board's
management powers under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008). Id. at 234-35. While holding
that the proposed bylaw was indeed procedural in nature, the court nonetheless also found that
such a bylaw, if adopted, could cause CA to violate Delaware law, by potentially requiring the
directors to reimburse proxy expenses in breach of their fiduciary duties. Id. at 240.
309. Id. at 232 & n.6 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 437 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
310. Id. at 234-35.
311. See id. at 232.
312. See Peers, supra note 188.
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reincorporation in Delaware benefited a firm's shareholders and
positively affected its stock prices. 313 These studies provided support
for a "race to the top" perspective on the jurisdictional competition
debate of the 1980s. 314 However, more recent studies have cast doubt
on the continued existence of a significant valuation premium
associated with reincorporation in Delaware, and have even raised the
specter of a negative Delaware effect. 315
Ultimately, the promised share price rise for News Corp. stock
has been elusive. In spite of record profits, News Corp.'s share price
fell by over 10 percent in the twelve months following its
reincorporation. 316 The adoption and extension of News Corp.'s poison
pill also appeared to negatively affect its share price:317 in the three
months following the company's announcement of the unilateral
extension of its poison pill, News Corp. shares fell by around 15
percent.3 18 News Corp.'s Tobin's Q,319 which is a proxy for the value of
313. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. EcON & ORG. 225, 272 (1985) (rebutting prior assertions to the contrary). Further support
was later given to this position by Daines, who found a 5 percent positive effect on firm value
from re-incorporating in Delaware, using Tobin's Q analysis. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 554 tbl.11 (2001).
314. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977) (critiquing the dominant "race to the bottom"
conception). See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 16-24
(1993) (comparing both "race to the bottom" and "race to the top" approaches empirically and
ultimately supporting Winter's view). The "race to the top" approach assumed that Delaware's
preeminence derived from the fact that its corporate law rules were superior to those of other
places of incorporation. However, both the assumption of vigorous jurisdictional competition for
charters and the assumption of Delaware's superiority have been challenged in recent times. On
the issue of whether active competition for state charters exists, see, for example, Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over
Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 555 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002). On the issue of the assumed
superiority of Delaware's laws, see generally William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The
Mystery of Delaware Law's Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1-62 (2009).
315. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON & ORG.
32, 33 (2004). For general discussion of the trajectory of this debate, see Carney & Shepherd,
supra note 314, at 9-11; Tobias H. Tr6ger, Corporate Governance in a Viable Market for
Secondary Listings, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L 89, 178-80 (2007).
316. According to Mr. Murdoch, contributing factors to News Corp.'s depressed share price
were the forced sale of News Corp. stock by many Australian index funds and a general bear
market in media stock. See Coultan, supra note 200; see also FinAnalysis daily price data for
News Corporation's common stock on the ASX.
317. See FinAnalysis daily price data for News Corp.'s common stock on the ASX for the
announcement dates of the poison pill (Nov. 8, 2004) and its extensions (Aug. 10, 2005). This
potentially accords with studies which show that introduction of entrenchment features in
corporate governance decreases firm value. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 236,
at 785.
318. Coultan, supra note 200. It has been suggested that in the period before settling its
differences with John Malone, News Corp. may actually have benefited from a lower stock price.
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its growth options, dropped 25 percent from the fiscal year-end
immediately prior to reincorporation 320 to the fiscal year-end
immediately following reincorporation. 32 1
VI. CONCLUSION
We used to joke that the problem with News Corp stock was half of the shareholders are
afraid Rupert will die and the other half are afraid that he won't.
- John Malone322
The aim of this Article has been to reconsider, through a
detailed case study of News Corp.'s migration from Australia to
Delaware, an embedded assumption in much contemporary corporate
governance scholarship that a unified common law corporate
governance model exists. The News Corp. reincorporation saga
highlights a number of important differences between U.S. and
Australian corporate law rules relating to shareholder rights and
provides a valuable counterpoint to convergence theory, which often
assumes that a homogeneous shareholder protection regime exists
within the common law world. The News Corp. reincorporation case
study is also relevant to the ongoing shareholder empowerment
debate. It tests claims about the evolutionary nature of the current
U.S. system of corporate governance that are often inherent in anti-
shareholder empowerment arguments. It also demonstrates the
importance of focusing on specific legal rules, rather than broad
generalizations, in comparative corporate governance scholarship.
The net result of News Corp.'s move from Australia to
Delaware was an appreciable reduction in shareholder rights and an
enhancement of managerial powers, including the power to implement
poison pills-a power unavailable in Australia. Although News Corp.
asserted that legitimate commercial goals prompted its original
reincorporation proposal,323 the alacrity with which the company
adopted a poison pill upon arrival in Delaware324 strongly suggests
See Stephen Bartholomeusz, Murdoch's Happy to Miss Australia's King Tide, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, June 9, 2005, at 26.
319. Measured by the ratio of its market value of equity to its book value of equity.
320. I.e. June 30, 2004.
321. I.e. June 30, 2005. See generally FinAnalysis daily price data and annual financial
reports for News Corporation.
322. Chenoweth, supra note 171 (quoting John Malone).
323. NEWS CORP., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 4 ("We undertook this move for one
reason: to create greater value for our shareholders."). For other perceived benefits, see Press
Release, News Corp., supra note 57, at 2.
324. Press Release, News Corp., supra note 175.
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that gaining access to Delaware's pro-managerial governance regime
was an important aspect of the reincorporation decision. 325
The concessions demanded by News Corp.'s institutional
investors were designed to respond to the reduction of their rights
under Delaware law. As this Article shows, however, News Corp.
sought to subvert key concessions via an array of methods, both in
Australia and Delaware. These methods included use of ASX waivers,
reversal of the board policy on poison pills, and arguments in the
UniSuper litigation that shareholder constraints on board power to
issue poison pills contravened Delaware law. 3 2 6 Indeed, the degree of
News Corp.'s resistance to the enforceability of the concessions-
resistance that, according to Chancellor Chandler, would ultimately
land News Corp. in a "stew of its own making"327-further suggests
that access to Delaware law provided a major inducement for the
reincorporation.
News Corp.'s reincorporation has important implications for
Delaware law. The pro-management focus of Delaware law may
provide a competitive advantage in encouraging reincorporation by
foreign companies. Nonetheless, as Chancellor Chandler recognized in
UniSuper, if Delaware law fails to recognize concessions provided to
shareholders in exchange for their support of reincorporation
proposals, shareholders of foreign companies may be deterred from
approving reincorporation in Delaware in the future.328
In the wake of the current global financial crisis, the regulatory
environment is a dynamic and unpredictable one. Regulatory reform,
including in the area of shareholder rights, is now squarely on the
agenda in the United States, and there is also increased interest in
international corporate regulatory regimes. An assessment of News
Corp.'s reincorporation challenges the inevitability of the U.S.
corporate governance status quo in relation to the balance of power
between shareholders and the board of directors. It emphasizes the
fact that, although there are many basic similarities between
corporate governance in the United States and in other common law
325. See, e.g., Power & Chenoweth, supra note 58. Some commentators took the view,
however, that the real reason for News Corp.'s move to Delaware might never be known. See
Knight, supra note 58 ("What we will never know is the extent to which this move offshore was
motivated by the potential re-rating or the deterioration of minorities' rights and the
enhancement of Murdoch family control.").
326. See, e.g., UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. Civ.A. 1699-N, 2006 WL 207505 at *1 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 20, 2006) (expressing concern that News Corp.'s view of Delaware law, would, if correct,
potentially invalidate all of News Corp.'s governance concessions, not merely the board policy on
poison pills).
327. Id. at *1-2.
328. Id. at *1.
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jurisdictions, there are nonetheless sufficient differences to make
comparative analysis not only fruitful and interesting, 329 but also
highly relevant to future law reform.
329. L.C.B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1956) ("[1]f there are sufficient basic similarities to make a comparison
possible, there are, equally, sufficient differences to make it fruitful.").
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